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Sharing Negawatts: Property Law, 
Electricity Data, and Facilitating the Energy 
Sharing Economy 
Heather Payne* 
ABSTRACT 
 
While the sharing economy has mostly focused on tangible assets or 
facilitating labor transactions, the potential to incorporate sharing—in the 
form of changes to behavior that create societal good—requires a different 
construct for electricity: one focused on an intangible asset, specifically 
data. With data access and sharing, it becomes possible not only to value 
negawatts—the decision not to use electricity at a given time—but to 
provide an incentive for load reduction, load shifting, and peak shaving, 
all three of which provide societal benefits by aiding reliability, decreasing 
capital requirements, and preventing greenhouse gas emissions. 
While sharing data can itself have value and create a market that 
enables behavior change, the energy sharing economy around demand 
response is two-fold: the data are shared, which enables the market to 
value behavior changes, and, when that market indicates sufficient value, 
the demand response action is shared. By not using energy at that point in 
time—by removing electric load—sharing occurs, leading to system-wide 
and overall societal benefits. 
However, none of this will occur without clear ownership of—and, 
therefore, the ability to monetize—electricity usage data. This article will 
discuss the sharing economy and how those concepts could be applied to 
electricity, survey how different states have approached the ownership of 
electricity data, classify and explore the ownership of electricity usage data 
through the lens of traditional property law concepts, and discuss how 
those various solutions affect the ability to value demand response 
 
*Associate Professor of Law at the Seton Hall University School of Law; J.D., University 
of North Carolina School of Law; B.Ch.E., Georgia Institute of Technology. I am grateful 
to the participants of the Property Implications of the Sharing Economy conference at Penn 
State Law (University Park) for invaluable feedback. This work also benefited from 
comments following presentations at Loyola University Chicago School of Law and Seton 
Hall University School of Law. Thanks to Jonathan Zator for excellent research assistance. 
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behaviors. It will then discuss what changes are necessary to facilitate the 
energy sharing economy. 
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Negawatt: a megawatt of power saved by increasing efficiency or reducing 
consumption.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With the advent of increased computer power and the ever-
decreasing cost of storing data in the cloud, data analytics are impacting 
almost every facet of American life: the ads we see while we browse the 
internet, the offers sent to us in the mail, and what is recommended for us 
in a Netflix queue. This ability to analyze large amounts of data has 
enabled the sharing economy in addition to the capitalist one, leading to 
the creation of firms such as Airbnb and Lyft. Energy—and electricity 
specifically—has not escaped this trend, with, for example, analytics used 
to determine which buildings could see the most improvement from 
increased energy efficiency, new lighting, and even just an HVAC tune-
up.2 
However, unlike much of the commercial landscape, the monetary 
opportunities provided by using this electricity usage data are just starting 
to be recognized, such as creating value through demand response, where 
a consumer shifts electricity use away from high-demand times and 
generates “negawatts.” As more companies find ways to monetize utility 
data—and as businesses and individuals are given the opportunity to either 
save money or make money using the insights provided—the legal aspects 
of utility data will become more important. This is especially true as some 
of the technologies and strategies that are developed and implemented 
based on the data can decrease grid expenditures, decrease global 
warming, and increase efficiency. 
As recently noted by a leading clean tech news outlet, “[s]tates are 
leading policy developments in much of today’s grid edge landscape, 
 
 1.  Margaret Rouse, Negawatt, TECHTARGET (Mar. 2010), 
http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/negawatt. 
 2.  However, even this part of the energy transition needs more data sharing.  See 
Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Energy Consumption Data: The Key to 
Improved Energy Efficiency, 6 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 69, 73 (2015) (“These 
analytics rest on a foundation of energy consumption data . . . that is currently not available 
in any meaningful way to consumers, energy service companies, and government funders 
or researchers.”); see also Yueming Qiu & Anand Patwardhan, Big Data and Residential 
Energy Efficiency Evaluation, 5 CURRENT SUSTAINABLE/RENEWABLE ENERGY REPS. 67, 67 
(2018) (“Results reveal that the majority of existing energy efficiency evaluation 
frameworks and traditional statistical analysis are not sufficient enough to identify the 
causal impact of energy efficiency. In reality, households mostly self-select into energy 
efficiency installations and the observed changes in energy consumption after the 
installations may be due, at least in part, to certain factors that are generally time-variant 
and unobservable to the statistician . . . . Researchers can utilize emerging large-scale 
building energy datasets combined with high-frequency energy demand data to develop 
innovative computational energy efficiency evaluation frameworks.”) 
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including policies on energy data—who owns it, who gets to share it with 
whom, and how to protect it.”3 Smart meters—the primary way data are 
collected—are now providing data on the electricity usage of more than 
half of U.S. households,4 with more than ten million smart meters installed 
in California alone.5 These meters record electricity data at least hourly (if 
not more frequently),6 and report this usage data back to the utility 
company, typically over wireless communication technology.7 
While regulators (and utilities) are attempting to determine how to 
approach the changing energy landscape,8 more residential customers are 
starting to generate their own electricity, commercial customers are 
looking to procure additional renewables to meet sustainability pledges, 
and everyone wants to save money.9 Business models aided by smart 
meter data can help with all three, as long as those business models are 
allowed to exist by regulators and the data is available from utilities. To 
explore this evolving area, this article will discuss the sharing economy 
and how those concepts could be applied to energy, survey how different 
states have approached the ownership of electricity usage data, classify 
and explore the ownership of electricity usage data through the lens of 
traditional property law concepts, and discuss how those various solutions 
affect the ability to value demand response behaviors. It will then discuss 
 
 3.  Jeff St. John, PJM Talks to Congress, While FERC Waits on Appointees & the 
DOE Grid Study, GREENTECH MEDIA SQUARED (July 28, 2017), http://bit.ly/2AYculj 
[hereinafter St. John, PJM Talks to Congress]. 
 4.  ADAM COOPER, THE EDISON FOUND., ELECTRIC COMPANY SMART METER 
DEPLOYMENTS: FOUNDATION FOR A SMART GRID 1 (Oct. 2016), https://bit.ly/2ePKTZv. 
Approximately 200 million smart meters have been installed worldwide. See Heather 
Lovell et al., How do meters mediate? Energy meters, boundary objects and household 
transitions in Australia and the United Kingdom, ENERGY RES. & SOC. SCI., Dec. 2017, at 
252, 252. 
 5.  Jeff St. John, US Smart Meter Deployments to Hit 70M in 2016, 90M in 2020, 
GREENTECH MEDIA (Oct. 26, 2016), http://bit.ly/2Di6i9J [hereinafter St. John, Smart Meter 
Deployments]. Both PG&E and Southern California Edison have more than five million 
installed each. By number of meters installed per utility, this is followed in volume by 4.9 
million installed by Florida Power & Light and 3.4 million by Oncor in Texas. Id.  
 6.  See Reports on Demand Response & Advanced Metering, FED. ENERGY 
REGULATORY COMM’N, https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/demand-
response/dem-res-adv-metering.asp (last updated Nov. 7, 2018); see also Klass & Wilson, 
supra note 2, at 76. 
 7.  St. John, Smart Meter Deployments, supra note 5. 
 8.  Research in Australia and the United Kingdom found that the main issue with 
adoption of smart meter technology was the fact that households were not kept in the center 
of the transition, but that the transition was more successful when it ensured that “digital 
meters provide functionality aimed specifically at enhancing householders’ capabilities to 
use the energy data collected in ways they find desirable.” Lovell et al., supra note 4, at 
257. 
 9.  See Heather Payne, Private (Utility) Regulators (forthcoming 2019). The price of 
electricity has gone up faster than the average consumer price index over the last 10 years.  
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what changes are necessary to facilitate the energy sharing economy, 
including ownership structure and potential regulatory frameworks. 
II. THE SHARING ECONOMY AND THE MARKET FOR 
NEGAWATTS 
The sharing economy10 can broadly be defined as “a socio-economic 
ecosystem built around the sharing of human, physical and intellectual 
resources. It includes the shared creation, production, distribution, trade 
and consumption of goods and services by different people and 
organisations.”11 Before applying the fundamentals of the sharing 
economy to energy, understanding these concepts more broadly is 
necessary.12 
A. The Sharing Economy – and the Data that Drives it 
There are three main participants in any transaction in the sharing 
economy—the entity with the good or service, the user who wants or needs 
that good or service, and the platform that connects the two of them.13 The 
platform is the essential element that has come about recently. In contrast 
to traditional bartering systems where each individual had to know each 
other, platforms “allow service providers and users to connect to the 
benefit of both.”14 The platforms—which I term market facilitators—
facilitate the transactions. 
Platforms and market facilitation in the sharing economy have been 
most prevalent in the hospitality and dining, automotive and 
transportation, retail and consumer goods, and media and entertainment 
industries.15 However, the concepts of the sharing economy—a provider, 
 
 10.  Other terms for the sharing economy include “the Trust Economy, Collaborative 
Consumption, the On-Demand or Peer-to-Peer Economy.” PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 
THE SHARING ECONOMY (2015), https://pwc.to/2qGxR4Y. 
 11.  Benita Matofska, What is the Sharing Economy?, THE PEOPLE WHO SHARE (Sept. 
1, 2016), http://www.thepeoplewhoshare.com/blog/what-is-the-sharing-economy/. 
 12.  There are ongoing conversations around liability in the sharing economy, 
including in the energy sphere around demand response that may not occur. See Wayne 
Pales, Who is accountable for reliability of the network with contracted demand response?, 
ENERGYCENTRAL (Mar. 29, 2018), https://bit.ly/2EzR8P6. I am not addressing the potential 
liability issues in this paper.   
 13.  Adam Hayes, The Economic Fundamentals of the Sharing Economy, 
INVESTOPEDIA,  http://bit.ly/2PUCuGA (last visited Nov. 10, 2018) (“P2P marketplaces 
exist to bring together individual buyers and sellers directly. This two-sided marketplace 
is often maintained by a third party that charges a fee for facilitating transactions between 
buyers and sellers and reducing transaction risk.”). 
 14.  Bernard Marr, The Sharing Economy - What It Is, Examples, And How Big Data, 
Platforms And Algorithms Fuel It, FORBES (Oct. 21, 2016, 2:16 AM), 
http://bit.ly/2zHu6Ao. 
 15.  PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 10. 
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a user, and a market facilitator—can be applied to the energy sector as 
well, and specifically to electricity and the data associated with electricity 
usage.16 
However, even with platforms or market facilitators to facilitate 
transactions in the sharing economy, data are necessary to value the 
transactions that occur.17 As Forbes noted, the sharing economy is driven 
by data.18 Essentially, “[t]hese companies don’t just represent a new way 
of thinking or new services, but a new way to use data effectively to 
provide services to people when and where they want them.”19 Without 
the data, it is impossible for the market facilitator to understand how to 
appropriately value the goods or services. 
Take an example that many of us may be familiar with—a ride 
facilitated by the Uber platform. Individuals need a ride somewhere, and 
Uber provides a price for the ride. That price is based on data. The relevant 
data used by the app in calculating the price includes: the time of day, the 
weather, the number of users, the destination, traffic, and how long it will 
take to reach my destination.20 The platform, however, simply provides an 
easy way for individuals to make an offer to the Uber drivers available in 
 
 16.  I define the term “electricity usage data” to include customer-specific data, 
aggregated, anonymized customer data, and utility system data. Usage data includes usage 
in kilowatt-hours and interval reads, also known as a load profile. System data includes 
“the customer assigned peak load contribution, energy and capacity loss factors, or other 
information needed for wholesale market participation.” MICHAEL MURRAY ET AL., 
MISSION:DATA, ENERGY DATA: UNLOCKING INNOVATION WITH SMART POLICY 1, 6 (Dec. 
2017), http://bit.ly/2Pl5qIl. The smart meter enables the change in identity from only a 
consumer of electricity to something more. See Lovell et al., supra note 4, at 254 (“[A] key 
change with the introduction of digital energy meters is in the role of the householder social 
world, for digital meters are a means to constitute novel forms of energy user identities 
among householders by enabling new activities in the home. The boundaries of the energy 
meter have thus expanded from traditional metrology functions to include a host of 
additional features mostly aimed at the householder, such as providing detailed feedback 
on energy consumption from digital devices and new types of energy tariff.”). 
 17.  This is necessary for all transactions besides those which are entirely altruistic; 
however, even some that would seem entirely altruistic have greater societal good, which 
can be valued, although that value does not necessarily flow to the individual providing the 
good or service. 
 18.  Marr, supra note 14 (“Beyond a disillusionment with consumerism, what’s 
driving this trend is data. Most — if not all — of these upstarts would not be viable 
businesses, certainly not on a large scale, without leveraging a platform and a foundation 
of big data.”). 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Uber uses “Dynamic Pricing, in which the price of a ride is determined based on 
constantly varying factors such as the estimated time and distance of the predicted route, 
estimated traffic, and the number of riders and drivers using Uber at a given moment.”  
Privacy Policy, UBER, https://privacy.uber.com/policy/ (last updated May 25, 2018). The 
weather affects how man people will be asking for a ride, as does the time of day. See Neil 
Patel, How Uber Uses Data to Improve Their Service and Create the New Wave of 
Mobility, NeilPatel.com, https://neilpatel.com/blog/how-uber-uses-data/ (last visited Jan. 
15, 2019).  
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the area—and they accept the offer by agreeing to drive the individuals to 
their preferred destination. Without the data, the Uber platform may 
significantly undervalue or overvalue the price of my offer—but having 
the data available ensures that the platform can accurately value the 
transactions it facilitates. 
Data has been described as “the lifeblood of today’s economy” for 
exactly that reason—because it facilitates transactions.21 Specifically 
around energy, a leading national clean energy business association 
described it best: 
Timely and convenient access to granular customer and electricity 
system data is critical to support the development of a modern grid.  
Such access allows utilities and competitive suppliers to optimize 
offers and enables individual customers and their designated third-
party providers to better manage energy use, consider distributed 
energy resource (DER) options, reduce costs, and participate in utility 
demand management programs and emerging transactive energy 
markets.  In addition, providing third parties with access to 
anonymized, aggregated customer data and electricity system data is 
critical to enabling these companies to design and offer products and 
services that will benefit utility customers, and the electricity grid as a 
whole.22  
Only with this granular data can customers have actionable insights—and 
participate in the sharing economy.23 The lack of the ability to have this 
data, then, hampers the development of the sharing economy and the grid 
and environmental benefits that could come along with it.24 
 
 21.  ADVANCED ENERGY ECON., ACCESS TO DATA: BRINGING THE ELECTRICITY GRID 
INTO THE INFORMATION AGE 2 (Sept. 2017), https://info.aee.net/hubfs/PDF/Access-to-
data.pdf [hereinafter ACCESS TO DATA]. For a different opinion of the effect on regulatory 
law generally and environmental law specifically, see William Boyd, Environmental Law, 
Big Data, and the Torrent of Singularities, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 544 (2016). 
 22.  ACCESS TO DATA, supra note 21.  
 23.  Adrian Tuck, 3 Steps to Making Utilities Formidable Energy Providers in the On-
Demand Era, GREENTECH MEDIA (July 31, 2017), http://bit.ly/2RSRfr5 (“The fact is, 
energy is going the way of other service industries like entertainment and travel: more 
personalized, more customer-centric, more automated and more accessible.”). 
 24.  K Kaufmann, Utility customers and complexity: What if Bonbright was wrong?, 
SMART ELECTRIC POWER ALLIANCE (Oct. 12, 2017), http://bit.ly/2PPCKqh (“What all these 
programs have in common is that they require customers to weight monetary cost savings 
against their own comfort and the larger benefits demand reduction may have for their 
utility, the grid and, ultimately, other customers. In other words, they have to think both 
about how they use energy and how that affects others.”). Furthermore, it has been shown 
that customers do make different energy decisions once they have data from their smart 
meters. See Jonny Bairstow, Smart meters see 86% of people change energy behaviour, 
ENERGY LIVE NEWS (Nov. 1, 2017), http://bit.ly/2qFPEJl. 
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Of course, there are reasons why utilities may not want to share this 
data.25 With customers having more options rather than the traditional 
monopoly structure, their profits may be challenged unless they develop 
and offer more customer-centric products and services.26 They may also 
hope to use the data themselves to gain a competitive advantage.27 
However, the data are being generated by infrastructure that utilities are 
 
 25.  As one article noted, “the more pragmatic approach recognizes certain undeniable 
realities of the electric utility industry, where highend disruption is hardly imminent, and 
change has always been, and will likely continue to be, more incremental than in other 
industries.” Joel B. Eisen & Felix Mormann, Free Trade in Electric Power, 2018 UTAH L. 
REV. 49, 81–82 (2018). In an industry survey, over 80% of utility industry experts said the 
industry was not prepared for how distributed resources, including demand response, 
would change utility business models. See Nicholas Rinaldi, Are Utilities Prepared for a 
Next-Gen Power Grid? Survey Says ‘Not So Much’, GREENTECH MEDIA SQUARED (Jan. 14, 
2016), http://bit.ly/2QzjQ4r. Investor-owned utilities were one of the most pessimistic 
around the ability of the utility industry in terms of preparation. See id. 
 26.  Of course, developing new products and services could be a possibility, see Eisen 
& Mormann, supra note 24, at 85, though such initiatives typically happen in response to 
changing circumstances like restructuring or regulations. See Chris Warren, Utilities Have 
the Tools to Unleash the Power of Customers, GREENTECH MEDIA (Dec. 4, 2017), 
http://bit.ly/2DxUK2Q (“There simply haven’t been good regulatory incentives for utilities 
to seriously consider non-wires alternatives and incorporate demand-side management into 
how they plan their systems. That is finally starting to change, particularly in states like 
New York and California.”). Nonetheless, a few utility companies are starting to become 
more customer-centric. Edward Klump, Electricity: Thinking in megawatts? Look at 
customers, NRG says, ENERGYWIRE (Mar. 27, 2018), http://bit.ly/2T2Nqkr (“‘You 
shouldn’t be thinking about how many megawatts we own,’ Gutierrez [CEO of NRG 
Energy Inc.] said in an interview this month. ‘You should be thinking about how many 
customers we serve going forward.’”). Other businesses are also attempting to profit off 
the data being generated by—or needed by—utilities. See Peter Behr, Business: GE pulls 
profits from its ‘Big Data’ campaign, ENERGYWIRE (June 18, 2018), 
http://bit.ly/2RKbLtC; Justin Gerdes, Big Data Is Boosting Power Production, Reducing 
Downtime Across Wind Fleets, GREENTECH MEDIA (Jan. 24, 2018), http://bit.ly/2FhiASa. 
Others in the industry are also suggesting that utilities should look at demand response as 
a revenue driver, specifically by using aggregated data. See Warren, supra.  
 27.  This has already been done. See Endesa reduces churn by 50 percent, SAS, 
https://www.sas.com/en_us/customers/endesa.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2018). Utilities in 
the United States are planning on spending $20 billion on analytics in the next three years 
in attempts to engage customers and develop marketable insights and competitive 
advantage—enabled by smart meters and other systems deployed through rate-based 
programs. Olivia Chen, US Utilities to Spend $20 Billion on Customer Analytics Through 
2021, GREENTECH MEDIA (Nov. 8, 2017), http://bit.ly/2zI2xGY. Utilities are starting to 
acknowledge that they need to provide more value-add products and services, and that data 
is key to that. Nick Lanyi, DERs and the digital grid: No more pilots; full scaling ahead, 
SMART ELECTRIC POWER ALLIANCE (July 12, 2018), http://bit.ly/2qDEiWb. Partnerships 
with those developing voice-controlled home devices are another way utilities are 
attempting to use data to gain insight and profit. See Jeff St. John, Tracking Energy in the 
Connected Home That Amazon’s Alexa Built, GREENTECH MEDIA SQUARED (June 15, 
2018), http://bit.ly/2DeQuUT. There is also the potential for utility participation to distort 
the market as it develops. Lacey Johnson, Utilities, Grid Operators Tell FERC They Need 
Real-Time Data to Better Manage DERs, GREENTECH MEDIA (Apr. 12, 2018), 
http://bit.ly/2Dc1By1. 
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already being compensated for through their rates.28 Therefore, as the 
utility has already been compensated for its investment (and has received 
a profit on that capital investment), the data should be readily available to 
others.29  Allowing the utility to profit otherwise from the data would be 
giving them the opportunity for double payment. 
With data access and sharing, then, it becomes possible not only to 
value negawatts—the decision not to use electricity at a given time—but 
to more broadly apply the concepts inherent in the sharing economy.30 
However, to apply these concepts, it is first necessary to understand how 
negawatts are created: by demand response. 
Demand response is “reducing or shifting . . . electricity usage during 
peak periods in response to time-based rates or other forms of financial 
incentives.”31 And the number of demand response actions are increasing, 
either in response to a regulatory requirement32 or an incentive.33 But then 
how do negawatts and demand response tie to the sharing economy? 
The sharing economy provider, in the case of negawatts, is the person 
choosing not to use electricity at that given point in time.  The user, unlike 
most other transactions in the sharing economy, is the electric grid—and, 
 
 28.  ACCESS TO DATA, supra note 21. Utilities are also obtaining valuable operational 
information from devices like smart inverters, which are increasingly being required for 
distributed generation installations—paid for by the customer who installs it, rather than 
the utility who is gaining insights from the data. See Jeff St. John, Smart Inverters as a 
Grid Resource: A Snapshot of the Latest R&D Out of California, GREENTECH MEDIA 
SQUARED (July 20, 2018), http://bit.ly/2PO5L62. 
 29.  Utilities not being obstructionist could also make them appear to be part of the 
solution. Wayne Pales, The Utility of the future must support third party access to energy 
data, ENERGYCENTRAL (Dec. 5, 2017), https://bit.ly/2q1ZiFO. 
 30.  Coley Girouard, The Top 10 Utility Regulation Trends of 2017, GREENTECH 
MEDIA (Dec. 12, 2017), http://bit.ly/2AXWVdJ (“Timely and convenient access to energy 
data can help customers track and manage their energy use, empower third-party 
companies to animate the market for DERs, and enable utilities to transition to a more 
customer-focused culture and business model.”). 
 31.  Demand Response, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://bit.ly/2AYLX7y [hereinafter 
ACCESS TO DATA] (last visited Nov. 10, 2018). Others describe what is occurring as 
including increases in addition to reductions and shifts to better allow load changes as more 
intermittent generation is deployed on the grid. Herman K. Trabish, The new demand 
response and the future of the power sector, UTILITY DIVE (Dec. 11, 2017), 
http://bit.ly/2T38Ei4 [hereinafter Trabish  ¸The new demand response]. 
 32.  For instance, California will be moving to mandatory time-of-use rates in 2019. 
See Julia Pyper, How to Make Dynamic Pricing Work for Everyone, GREENTECH MEDIA 
SQUARED (Aug. 4, 2017), http://bit.ly/2QzTgrC (“In 2019, utilities in California will roll 
out time-of-use (TOU) rates at an unprecedented scale by making them the default for all 
residential electricity customers.”).  
 33.  A recent analysis found that “demand response programs are more likely to 
succeed in highly urbanized areas, in areas where economic growth rates are high, and in 
areas where the renewable energy policy is favorable.” Aman Srivastava et al., Assessing 
the success of electricity demand response programs: A meta-analysis, ENERGY RES. & 
SOC. SCI., June 2018, at 110, 110.  
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by extension, all those who are either generating or consuming electricity 
at that point in time. The platform—or market facilitator—are the 
companies which aggregate demand response actions, and can be a utility 
provider in some cases. 
Therefore, while sharing data can itself have value and create a 
market that enables behavior change, the energy sharing economy around 
demand response is two-fold: the data are shared, which enables the 
market to value behavior changes, and, when that market indicates 
sufficient value, the demand response action is shared. By not using energy 
at that point in time—by removing electric load—sharing occurs, leading 
to system-wide and overall societal benefits. These overall societal and 
grid benefits include load reduction, load shifting, and peak shaving, 
which lead to increased reliability, decreasing capital requirements leading 
to lower electricity rates for everyone, and preventing greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
Parts of the sharing economy are focused on providing a societal 
good, rather than a purely capitalist response to unused or underutilized 
resources. This is also true for the sharing electricity economy, with a 
perfect example being the actions of demand response aggregator Nest 
during the total solar eclipse on August 21, 2017, when carbon-free solar 
energy was reduced in some parts of the United States34 and more 
traditional power plants were brought on-line to make up the generation 
shortfall. Nest—a market facilitator who uses data to enable customers to 
save money by optimally setting temperatures—developed a “Solar 
Eclipse Rush Hour” program to help offset the drop in electricity 
production by shifting electricity usage to periods away from the eclipse.  
 
Nest owners agreed to participate by hitting a button on their thermostats 
that had this message: 
So, we’re encouraging people across the US to help offset this drop in 
energy production by pre-cooling their homes before the eclipse. If you 
don’t own a Nest thermostat, you can manually adjust the temperature 
by one or two degrees during the eclipse. If you join, a few hours 
before the eclipse hits your area, your Nest Thermostat may 
automatically pre-cool your home so that you can save energy during 
 
 34.  Nest estimated that more than 100 million solar panels would be impacted by the 
eclipse. Nest, Nest’s first Solar Eclipse Rush Hour, YOUTUBE (Aug. 10, 2017), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2xKvVZj9QOY. Other estimates include around 
1,900 utility-scale solar farms with a combined peak capacity of more than 20 gigawatts 
(GW). See Jeff St. John, U.S. Utilities Ready Back-Up Power, Demand Response for 
August 21 Solar Eclipse, THE ENERGY MIX (Aug. 14, 2017), http://bit.ly/2DgOewG. 
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the eclipse. After the eclipse, your thermostat will go back to its regular 
schedule.35 
The message to Nest owners is that they will be able to help in 
meaningfully reducing the amount of “dirty” energy that is necessary 
during the eclipse by sharing their negawatts. Additionally, the messaging 
explicitly noted how it was an easy way help the grid “that we all share.”36 
The eclipse essentially provided an opportunity for electricity customers 
to actually think about where their power comes from.37 And it worked: 
Nest reported after the fact that 750,000 Nest devices participated and 
shifted 700 MW of cumulative demand.38 Even with 1900 utility-scale 
plants and thousands of residential solar installations not generating, the 
grid had no issues during the eclipse.39 
While those with Nest thermostats gave negawatts to help the grid as 
a whole during the eclipse, the majority of the time right now, demand 
response actions are taken to either save money (or spend less) on 
electricity.40 Therefore, it is necessary to understand the market for 
demand response and how negawatts are valued, especially in competitive 
energy markets. 
B. The Market for Negawatts 
The utility sector is changing. As customers and regulators turn to 
more intermittent and renewable resources that are decentralized, demand 
response41 is becoming one tool to maintain a reliable, increasingly-
 
 35.  Mitchel Broussard, Nest Will Automatically Pre-Cool Homes Participating in 
New ‘Solar Eclipse Rush Hour’ Program, MACRUMORS (Aug. 11, 2017, 6:35 AM), 
https://www.macrumors.com/2017/08/11/nest-solar-eclipse-rush-hour/amp/. 
 36.  Nest, supra note 34. 
 37.  Julia Pyper, Looking Beyond the Eclipse: How the Historic Event Tested 
Customer Engagement on the Electric Grid, GREENTECH MEDIA (Aug. 21, 2017), 
http://bit.ly/2AZnIWT. 
 38.  See Nest’s Solar Eclipse Rush Hour Rewards Program, PEAK LOAD 
MANAGEMENT ALLIANCE (July 19, 2018), https://bit.ly/2Av5yfv. 
 39.  See Peter Behr & Debra Kahn, Grid operators take a stunning event in stride, 
ENERRGYWIRE (Aug. 22, 2017), https://bit.ly/2Rkgi5N; see also Chris Wood, No Problems 
for U.S. Power Grid as the Sun Goes Dark, THE ENERGY MIX (Aug. 22, 2017), 
https://bit.ly/2O8y9KZ (noting that the amount of solar curtailed by the eclipse was 
approximately 12,000 MW). 
 40.  As one commentator described it, the need for data sharing with third parties in 
the electricity space from a consumer’s perspective is “the introduction of services that we 
as energy consumers don’t know exist, and don’t yet know we want. These new services 
will deliver value, be simple to use, and will come from sources we trust.” Wayne Pales, 
Access to Energy Data – A Consumer’s Perspective, ENERGYCENTRAL (Dec. 19, 2017), 
https://bit.ly/2OTKpVb. 
 41.  For the purposes of this paper, I am not including energy efficiency as a demand 
response resource in the market context. 
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flexible grid.42 Able to quickly balance demand and supply,43 demand 
response also can decrease wholesale electricity prices, which then leads 
to lower retail prices as well.44 In addition to balancing, peak reductions 
can lead to deferred capital expenditures, both for generation assets and 
transmission and distribution grid upgrades.45 Peak shifting or peak 
shaving, then, can help drive many benefits for customers. The most 
straightforward way to obtain these benefits is through the competitive 
markets.46 
Two-thirds of the electricity demand in the United States is regulated 
through regional transmission organizations (RTOs).47 Along with 
independent system operators (ISOs), RTOs operate the transmission 
system, including managing it equitably and developing cost-sharing 
rules.48 Both ISOs and RTOs have energy and ancillary service markets, 
where generators offer generation and other services,49 and some also have 
capacity markets to ensure sufficient future generation capacity.50 ISOs 
foster competition for electric generation, and use economic dispatch 
models to procure the least expensive generation that will meet the needs 
of the grid at that point in time. Often, the cheapest resources are 
renewable resources,51 followed by “negawatts”—otherwise known as 
demand response.52 
 
 42.  See DOE, Demand Response, supra note 31. 
 43.  Customer demand response helped maintain grid reliability during the peak load 
in Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) this summer. See Edward Klump, ‘So 
Far, So Good’ for Grid Operator as Records Fall, ENERGYWIRE (Aug. 8, 2018), 
https://bit.ly/2SmobsR. 
 44.  See DOE, Demand Response, supra note 31. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  This is not to imply that vertically integrated utilities cannot implement demand 
response programs; they can, and do. However, without the ability to sell into a competitive 
market, the programs offered—and the accompanying compensation to customers—is 
limited to what the incumbent utility is willing to offer and pay. See Katherine Tweed, 
Does the Midwest Need Demand Response?, GREENTECH MEDIA (Apr. 18, 2016), 
https://bit.ly/2Av470I (“Utilities, most of which are vertically integrated in the Midwest, 
are simply uninterested in giving MISO more control of demand-response programs or 
allowing for aggregation of retail customers, at least for now.”). 
 47.  See Electric Power Markets: National Overview, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY 
COMM’N, https://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/mkt-electric/overview.asp (last updated 
Apr. 13, 2017). 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  See Trabish  ¸The new demand response, supra note 31. 
 51.  See Are Solar and Wind Really Killing Coal, Nuclear and Grid Reliability?, THE 
CONVERSATION (May 11, 2011, 9:20 PM), https://bit.ly/2s079Th. 
 52.  Demand response can be more comprehensive than load shifting. For an excellent 
discussion of demand response, see Joel Eisen, Demand Response’s Three Generations: 
Market Pathways and Challenges in the Modern Electric Grid, 18 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 351 
(2017).  
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C. How Demand Response is Valued 
The amount of demand response on the U.S. grid has increased.53 
That increase will likely continue due to the clarity provided by the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission in Order 745 and the United State 
Supreme Court’s decision in FERC v. EPSA54 upholding Order 745.55 
Order 745 mandated that, in areas served by an ISO or RTO, demand 
response providers were to be viewed as an alternative to generation that 
should be dispatched when economical, and that demand response 
resources should be provided the same price as a generator would be paid 
to put energy onto the system—the market price for energy.56 So, 
essentially, a negawatt was to be paid the same as a megawatt, and was to 
be dispatched by the same rules based on price. 
While the stated goal of Order 745 is to “help[] to ensure the 
competitiveness of organized wholesale energy markets and remove 
barriers to the participation of demand response resources,”57 
implementation since the order was finalized in 2011 has not necessarily 
been smooth. In addition to the EPSA litigation—in which the D.C. Circuit 
initially struck the order down before the U.S. Supreme Court reversed—
the market manager of PJM Interconnection LLC, the ISO covering much 
of the mid-Atlantic and the largest wholesale electricity market,58 called 
for tightening the rules on demand response providers, claiming that 
demand response “suppress[es] prices and inhibit[s] the construction of 
needed generation.”59 
 
 53.  Trabish  ¸The new demand response, supra note 31 (“But there are now more than 
13,600 MW of DR enrolled by utilities and about as much available to TSOs.”). 
 54.  Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 
(2016). 
 55.  Id. at 773. The Electric Power Supply Association (EPSA) had argued that 
demand response was a retail sale, rather than a sale of electric energy at wholesale in 
interstate commerce or a practice affecting such sales, which is what FERC has the ability 
to govern under the Federal Power Act. See id. at 781. Additionally, EPSA argued that the 
rule was arbitrary and capricious. See id at 782. However, the Supreme Court found, in a 
6-2 decision, that the Federal Power Act does give the FERC authority to set the 
compensation for demand response because the price of demand response is a practice 
which directly affects wholesale rates. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric 
Power Supply Association, SCOTUSBLOG, https://bit.ly/2Q6fW2N (last visited Nov. 10, 
2018). 
 56.  See Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, 
76 Fed. Reg. 16,658 (2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(g)(1)(v)). 
 57.  Id. at 16,658. 
 58.  See Rod Kuckro, PJM to Offer ‘stop gap’ Demand-Response Fixes by Year’s End, 
ENERGYWIRE (Oct. 24, 2014), https://bit.ly/2AuUe2P. 
 59.  Rob Kuckro, PJM Monitor Calls for Demand Response Market Reform, 
ENERGYWIRE (Mar. 17, 2014), 
https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2014/03/17/stories/1059996218. 
 368 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW Vol. 123:2 
The capacity auction in May of 2014 cleared 11,000 MW of demand 
response, but PJM was allowed to change its rules in 2015,60 making it 
more difficult for demand response to participate in the auction which 
occurred later in 2015. While approximately the same amount of demand 
response—more than 11,000 MW—cleared in 2015, it was in the “base 
capacity” category, which could not make up more than twenty percent of 
the auction results and cleared at a lower price.61 In the 2016 auction, only 
10,348 MW of demand response cleared—and the majority of that was 
again in the “base capacity” category, which had a lower clearing price 
than in 2015.62 For the 2017 auction, the “base capacity” category was 
eliminated—leading to a further decrease to only 7,500 MW of demand 
response clearing the auction.63 Experts concluded that the new rules 
would decrease the amount of both renewables and demand response 
clearing the auction, and that is exactly what happened.64 This result—and 
the feeling among many, including Chair Norman Bay—that consumers 
were paying more but not necessarily getting additional reliability for the 
extra cost, shows that additional market changes may be needed.65 As 
noted about the current market structure, “the key will be turning 
electricity capacity markets into demand-led flexibility markets . . . . The 
problem with capacity markets . . . is that they can lead to over-
provisioning with inflexible load and are not incentivized to reduce peak 
demand.”66 And reducing peak demand is exactly what demand reduction 
is good at. 
Therefore, while the current rules may not be especially helpful for 
demand response, the regulatory framework supporting the payment for 
 
 60.  See Cynthia Dizikes, New Power Rules Prompted by Polar Vortex May Hike 
Chicago-are Electricity Bills, CHI. TRIBUNE (July 28, 2015, 5:02 AM), 
https://trib.in/2qhguap. 
 61.  See Jeffrey Tomich, PJM Auction Sees Power Prices Soar Under New Reliability 
Rules, ENERGYWIRE (Aug. 24, 2015, 10:12 AM), https://bit.ly/2z61UGP. 
 62.  See Jeffrey Tomich, PJM Power Costs Fall by $4B on Efficiency, New Gas 
Plants, ENERGYWIRE (May 25, 2016, 9:14 AM), https://bit.ly/2EN4SpV. 
 63.  See Jeffrey Tomich, Capacity Prices Dip for Most of PJM Despite Tougher 
Standards, ENERGYWIRE (May 24, 2017), https://bit.ly/2ObIZ35. 
 64.  See Jeff St. John, PJM’s Latest Capacity Auction: A Tough Market for Nuclear 
& Demand Response, GREENTECH MEDIA (May 24, 2017), https://bit.ly/2AvDIQn. 
 65.  See Rod Kuckro, Bay Eschews Politics, Embraces Analytics as FERC Chairman, 
ENERGYWIRE (Sept. 8, 2015), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060024316 (“This auction 
will impose a considerable cost on consumers for no additional reliability benefit.”); see 
also Indicated Market Participants v. PJM Interconnection, No. EL15-88-000, 2015 WL 
5118643, at *10–11 (Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n Aug. 25, 2015) (order denying 
complaint) (Bay, Chairman, dissenting); Delia Patterson, Bay’s Dissent Highlights Flaws 
in Mandatory Capacity Markets, MORNING CONSULT (July 2, 2015), 
https://bit.ly/2CGjxAF. 
 66.  Katherine Tweed, Clean Energy Investment Fell by 17% in 2016. Here’s Why 
That’s Fine, GREENTECH MEDIA (Apr. 26, 2017), https://bit.ly/2D7syDL. 
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negawatts is in place. Additionally, FERC has proposed a rule that would 
require ISOs and RTOs to adjust rules so demand response aggregators 
“can compete in wholesale markets ‘under the participation model that 
best accommodates the physical and operational characteristics of its 
distributed energy resource aggregation.’”67 Those “distributed energy 
resources” being aggregated could include residential solar, battery 
storage, electric vehicles, hot water heaters, and home appliances—
leading to different benefits to the grid.68 While finalizing the rule and how 
it is implemented will determine its success from a demand response point 
of view, it certainly could help demand response aggregators thrive in the 
wholesale markets. 
D. “Negawatt” Aggregators – The Market Facilitators 
As noted above, the overall North American grid has an increasing 
amount of demand response; however, demand response will only develop 
where there is enough financial incentive for it to occur. Competitive 
markets provide this incentive by allowing demand response providers to 
monetize the actions of individual consumers (or their equipment) and bid 
this collectively into the market. PJM currently accounts for 
approximately 38% of the total demand response market, the same as 
MISO. ERCOT (Texas) accounts for seven percent, and the California 
market for six.69 
While California has a smaller overall percentage, it is driving the 
most regulatory change in terms of how demand response aggregators can 
obtain value for their contributions to the grid, mainly through the Demand 
Response Auction Mechanism (DRAM).70 California has transitioned 
from a utility-controlled demand response mechanism to a market-
controlled one, allowing for the system operator to have better visibility 
into what demand response aggregators can offer at any time. This allows 
resources at the distribution level to be more visible at the wholesale 
transmission level.71 
 
 67.  Julian Spector, FERC Proposes to Open Up Wholesale Markets for Energy 
Storage & Aggregation, GREENTECH MEDIA (Nov. 18, 2016), https://bit.ly/2fCVDu5. 
 68.  See Herman K. Trabish, How Aggregated DERs are Becoming the New Demand 
Response, UTILITY DIVE (July 20, 2016, https://bit.ly/29WbV0L ) [hereinafter Trabish, 
Aggregated DERs]. 
 69.  See Elta Kolo, U.S. Wholesale DER Aggregation: Q2 2017, GREENTECH MEDIA 
RESEARCH (May 2017), https://bit.ly/2Q1o5W0. 
 70.  See Jeff St. John, The Details Behind California’s Demand Response Auction 
Mechanism, GREENTECH MEDIA (Oct. 23, 2015), https://bit.ly/2AuxEYe. The Aliso 
Canyon gas leak also sped up the process, as natural gas plants were taken off-line due to 
a lack of supply, and demand response was one of the strategies CAISO turned to balance 
the grid. See id. 
 71.  Trabish, Aggregated DERs, supra note 68. 
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Aggregators do exactly what the name implies—take many smaller 
demand response possibilities and build them into a portfolio.72 In addition 
to potentially offering their load into a capacity market, many aggregators 
develop their products to be offered to a utility to balance intermittent 
renewables, system peaks, or other constraints, like transmission loads.73 
Demand responses—and, therefore, what aggregators are aggregating—
fall into two categories: automated responses and behavioral responses. 
1. Automated Responses 
While some demand response growth has been outside the traditional 
utility structure, this should not be taken to indicate some utilities are not 
embracing the benefits that demand response can offer. More than nine 
million utility accounts were enrolled in incentive-based demand response 
programs in 2015.74 Programs with automated responses are the most 
common in demand response, and have been traditionally seen as more 
sure—because they are based on equipment switches rather than a human 
being making a choice—and can often be done remotely. Larger, industrial 
loads often have a direct contract with the utility—but smaller, residential 
loads that can be reduced are often aggregated. 
The most common type of residential program is the one where, in 
exchange for a bill credit, a utility can cycle residential air conditioners on 
and off during hot afternoons every summer.75 These types of programs 
require either a thermostat with a wireless connection or a switch installed 
near the air conditioning unit, but not a smart meter, and are widely 
available to customers who would like to participate.76 
However, even at 9 million accounts enrolled, this is a relatively 
small percentage of the available potential, given the more than 144 
million metered accounts that exist in the United States. The average 
 
 72.  For a more transformative proposition which allows the market to flourish both 
with and without aggregators, see Eisen & Mormann, supra note 24. 
 73.  Robert Walton, Why BPA Sees Aggregation as the Future of Demand Response, 
UTILITY DIVE (June 24, 2015), https://bit.ly/2qcVqBV. 
 74.  MICHAEL P. LEE ET AL., FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, ASSESSMENT OF 
DEMAND RESPONSE & ADVANCED METERING 25 (Dec. 2017), 
https://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/2017/DR-AM-Report2017.pdf. The most recent 
available data is from 2015, having been published in December, 2017. 
 75.  See ROADMAP FOR IMPLEMENTING MICHIGAN’S NEW ENERGY POLICY STEERING 
COMM., COMMON DEMAND RESPONSE PRACTICES AND PROGRAM DESIGNS 3, 
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/energy/Common_Practices_Feb22_522983_7.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 15, 2019). For Duke Energy Carolinas, the bill credit is $32 annually, and 
units can by cycled as often as every half hour during summer afternoons between May 
and September. See Power Manager, DUKE ENERGY, https://www.duke-
energy.com/home/products/power-manager (last visited Aug. 20, 2017). 
 76.  See Residential Demand Response Programs, CLEARLY ENERGY (Oct. 10, 2016), 
https://www.clearlyenergy.com/residential-demand-response-programs. 
 2019 SHARING NEGAWATTS 371 
participation rate for these more traditional programs is less than five 
percent of customers for a given utility.77 
One study found that fear of discomfort—of customers’ concern for 
losing control—has hindered adoption.78 A recent announcement stressed 
how technology is attempting to deal with that issue and encourage further 
participation: 
Under the residential demand response pilot project . . ., Whisker will 
enroll 3,000 customers of ComEd and Nicor Gas who already have a 
Honeywell Wi-Fi thermostat installed in their home.  
Whisker is one of several startups promising to collect “hyper-local” 
weather, building, demographic and energy usage data to build 
thermodynamic models of individual homes, and run it through 
algorithms that can fine-tune thermostats to shave energy during hours 
of peak grid demand without affecting customer comfort.79 
While automated responses will help shave peak and reduce load at the 
times most needed, there is a limit to how much can be achieved using 
these technologies. Behavioral demand response will be needed to start 
shifting loads to meet available generation. 
2. Behavioral Responses 
Opower, now a division of Oracle, works with utilities to manage 
behavioral responses, rather than peak reductions that rely on equipment. 
They have found having specific words trigger larger actions (including 
“neighbor,” which triggers a competitive reaction) and smiley faces.80 
Baltimore Gas and Electric (BGE), understanding that there was concern 
about regulatory structures like time of use rates which could dampen peak 
demand but which might penalize those who did not change behavior, 
 
 77.  See Jeff St. John, The Inside Story on Baltimore Gas & Electricity’s Behavioral-
Based Demand Response, GREENTECH MEDIA SQUARED (Jan. 11, 2017), 
https://bit.ly/2D70U9R [hereinafter St. John, Inside Story on Baltimore]. 
 78.  See generally Xiaojing Xu et al., Promoting Acceptance of Direct Load Control 
Programs in the United States: Financial Incentive Versus Control Option, 147 ENERGY 
1278–87 (2018). Interestingly, the authors found no relationship “between incentive 
amount and participation rate in [direct load control] programs,” but instead found that “it 
is important to grant customers some level of control or restore some sense of control to 
keep them satisfied and accepting of [demand reduction] programs.” Id. at 1279, 1285. 
 79.  Jeff St. John, Investment Watch: Grid Edge Companies Pull in More Money from 
Utilities, GREENTECH MEDIA SQUARED (Aug. 4, 2017), https://bit.ly/2SpMuX4. 
 80.  See Robert Walton, ‘Game-ifying’ Demand Response: How One Utility Tries to 
Keep DR Programs Fresh for Customers, UTILITY DIVE (Mar. 9, 2016), 
https://bit.ly/1paKGkD. 
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decided to try a different approach—which they could do, based on their 
completed smart meter rollout.81 
Rather than apply a standard process where customers sign up in 
advance for a program, BGE automatically enrolled every customer with 
a smart meter—and it has more than 1 million accounts with smart 
meters—in a program which provides a credit for every kilowatt a 
customer cuts on peak days, compared with that customer’s average 
usage.82 Most importantly, to aid customers in understanding how their 
behavior impacts their bill, the amount of the credit is texted or e-mailed 
to them shortly after the event, reinforcing the behavior change.83 During 
the peak event, BGE can sell the aggregated “negawatts” into the PJM 
energy market, with both customers and the utility benefitting financially 
from the program.84 
Interestingly, Opower has found that the average decrease in peak is 
around five percent—or, if behavioral demand response were deployed 
nationally, the country could shave 4,700 MW of demand85—equivalent 
to the four new nuclear units that were being built in South Carolina and 
Georgia for more than $40 billion, but without the risk or nuclear waste. 
III. HOW STATES CURRENTLY ADDRESS OWNERSHIP OF 
ELECTRICITY USAGE DATA 
As noted above, while sharing data can itself have value and create a 
market that enables behavior change, the energy sharing economy around 
demand response is two-fold: the data are shared, which enables the 
market to value behavior changes, and, when that market indicates 
sufficient value, the demand response action is shared. 
The most fundamental requirement for demand response is electricity 
usage data, as this enables the market discussed previously to value the 
negawatts. Without data, market facilitators have no way to determine 
which sharing economy providers to approach to participate, and those 
providers cannot determine how much participating would save them on 
 
 81.  See Ethan Howland, How Opower and BGE are Pioneering Behavioral Demand 
Response, UTILITY DIVE (Jan. 14, 2014), https://bit.ly/1aPQ13m. 
 82.  Walton, supra note 80.  
 83.  St. John, Inside Story on Baltimore, supra note 77.  
 84.  See id.; Julia Pyper, Some New Ideas for Redesigning Energy Efficiency Policies, 
GREENTECH MEDIA SQUARED (July 21, 2017), http://bit.ly/2DjtHrl [hereinafter Pyper, 
Some New Ideas] (“For all DR that exceeds 200 MW in a given year, the utilities can bid 
the aggregated savings into the PJM capacity market and keep a portion of the earnings,” 
it continues. “The total revenue from EE and DR over the last eight auctions exceeds $300 
million. Customers retain most of the savings, while the utilities earn a portion, providing 
them more incentive to push for even deeper efficiency and cost savings.”). 
 85.  Robert Walton, How Opower is Pushing Behavioral Demand Response into the 
Mainstream, UTILITY DIVE (May 27, 2015), http://bit.ly/2POUthO. 
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their electricity bills. However, who has access to and ownership of 
electricity usage data will largely determine how successful such 
initiatives could be. 
Data has neither value nor meaning without context or some other 
purpose attributed to the raw numbers and information.86 Generally, the 
ownership of data depends on “what the data is, how it was generated, 
what devices were used, where it came from, and whether it is attributable 
to a person or thing.”87 The source of the data and who owns it defines 
“who gets to use it, and how or whether it gets used.”88 
The Federal Smart Metering Law of 2005 states that “[a]ll electricity 
purchasers shall be provided direct access, in written or electronic 
machine-readable form as appropriate, to information from their 
electricity provider.”89 Further, the law states that “[p]urchasers shall be 
able to access their own information at any time.”90 Then, regarding third 
parties, “[o]ther interested persons shall be able to access information not 
specific to any purchaser.”91 Taken together, these rules suggest that the 
utility company is the primary possessor of the data, but has to give access 
to customers and third-parties. Another federal law, the Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA), discusses general policies 
for growing the smart grid and improving security.92 Under EISA, utility 
data can be collected and used for analysis by the Department of Energy.93 
However, state law is developing more quickly in some cases and 
lagging behind the federal mandate in others.94 A recent scholarly work 
discussing electricity usage data stated that “[o]wnership of energy 
consumption data in the context of the Smart Grid presents a complex 
question that extends beyond ‘ownership’ as a property right, and pertains 
 
 86.  John Sumser & Heather Bussing, Who Owns Data 1 - Overview, HR EXAMINER 
(Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.hrexaminer.com/who-owns-data-1-overview/ (“For example, 
if you have 3 digits of a phone number, you have data, but you don’t have the phone 
number. Even if you have all 10 digits, they still have to be in the right order to reach the 
person you want to call. So you have to know the context of what you are trying to do with 
those numbers.”). 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  16 U.S.C. § 2621(d)(19)(A) (2012 & Supp. 2017). 
 90.  Id. § 2621(d)(19)(B). 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 
1492.  
 93.  42 U.S.C. § 17384 (2012 & Supp. 2017). The federal government, however, has 
started the process to use other energy data to monetize data and drive change, like the 
orange button program, used in an attempt to reduce solar installation costs. See Aaron 
Smallwood, The Orange Button Initiative: How Standardized Data Can Cut Solar Soft 
Costs, SMART ELECTRIC POWER ALLIANCE (June 1, 2017), 
https://sepapower.org/knowledge/orange-button-initiative/. 
 94.  See Klass & Wilson, supra note 2, at 69.  
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more to issues of data access and usage.”95 Under state law, customers 
have strong access rights but generally the utility company possesses, 
collects, records, or explicitly owns the data. 
Interestingly, given the large amounts of data that are already being 
collected from smart meters—more than half of U.S. households had a 
smart meter by the end of 201596—it is somewhat astonishing how few 
public utility commissions (or state legislatures) have addressed the issue 
of data ownership. Many states provide customers with a right to access 
information collected by their utility, with some variations, or have at least 
expressed a policy preference for such customer access.97 However, only 
 
 95.  H. Russell Frisby, Jr. & Jonathan P. Trotta, The Smart Grid: The Complexities 
and Importance of Data Privacy and Security, 19 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 297, 330 
(2011). 
 96.  COOPER, supra note 4. 
 97.  Alabama: GEN. R. ALA. PUB. SERV. COMM’N 5–9 (1998), 
http://www.psc.alabama.gov/Administrative/GenRules_01_10_05.pdf (providing 
customer with some rights to access information). Alaska: Consideration of Adoption of 
Regulations to Implement Amend. to the Pub. Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 
2010 WL 4655901, at *22 (Regulatory Comm’n Alaska Nov. 9, 2010) (order inviting 
public comment). Arizona: ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § 14-2-1612 (LexisNexis 2018) (“[A]n 
Electric Service Provider who provides metering or meter reading services pertaining to a 
particular consumer shall provide appropriate meter reading data via standardized 
formats.”). Arkansas: Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 2011 WL 3675548 (Ark. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n Aug. 3, 2011) (order approving settlement agreement) (providing information to 
customers “upon request”); ARK. PUB. SERV. COMM’N GEN. SERV. R. 19 (2016), 
http://www.apscservices.info/Rules/general_service_rules_2016.pdf. California: CAL. 
PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8381 (West 2018). Colorado: Smart Grid Data Privacy for Elec. 
Utilities, 2011 WL 5115728, at *1 (Colo. Pub. Util. Comm’n Apr. 14, 2011) (proposed 
rules) (providing usage information upon request). Connecticut: CONN. AGENCIES REGS. 
§ 16-244h-4 (LexisNexis 2018) (permitting electric providers to release customer-specific 
information at will, with customers having an option to revoke permission). Delaware: 
Restructuring of Elec. Util. Indus., 183 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 340, 1998 WL 149031 
(Del. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Jan. 27, 1998) (report to the Del. H.R.) (permitting customers to 
access historic load and bill information). Florida: FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 25-6.093 
(LexisNexis 2018) (allowing customers can request access to data). Hawaii: HAW. PUB. 
SERV. COMM’N, GEN. ORDER NO. 7 – STANDARDS FOR ELECTRIC UTILITY SERVICE IN THE 
STATE OF HAWAII, r. 4.1 (1968), http://puc.hawaii.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/General-Order-7.pdf. Iowa: IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 199-19.4 
(LexisNexis 2018) (allowing customers access to data to verify billing). Kansas: Gen. 
Investigation Related to Smart Metering Tech., 2007 WL 9182288, at *1 (Kan. State Corp. 
Comm’n Aug. 8, 2007) (report and recommendations) (encouraging development of smart 
meter programs). Louisiana: Dixie Elec. Membership Corp., 2012 WL 5994667 (La. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n Nov. 20, 2012) (order approving smart meter program) (noting that the 
utility “provide[s] real-time information to customers”). Maine: Elisa Boxer-Cook et al., 
2011 WL 2521416 (Me. Pub. Util. Comm’n June 22, 2011) (order pt. II) (expressing 
support for improved customer access to usage information through smart metering, but 
providing customers with a right to opt-out). Michigan: Detroit Edison Co. v. Michigan 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 817 N.W.2d 630, 637 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (observing that the intent 
of smart meters is to allow customers to access the utility’s collected data); DTE Elec. Co., 
2016 WL 6778372, at *9 (order to file a report) (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Nov. 7, 2016). 
Minnesota: Comm’n Inquiry into Privacy Policies of Rate-Regulated Energy Utilities, 
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three jurisdictions have either clear decisions or clear regulations on 
ownership: the District of Columbia (the utility company owns the data 
when dealing with third parties);98 Oklahoma (“[a]ll data generated, 
 
2017 WL 282441, at *1 (Minn. Pub. Util. Comm’n Jan. 19, 2017) (order governing 
disclosure of customer energy use data to third parties) (implying that the utility owns 
usage information, but the customer has rights regarding the release of such information). 
Mississippi: Entergy Mississippi, Inc., 2017 WL 2000907, at *3 (Miss. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n May 4, 2017) (order approving smart meter program). Montana: Montana-
Dakota Utilities Co., 2008 WL 9894536, ¶¶ 37–41 (Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Apr. 23, 
2008). Nevada: NV Energy, 2012 WL 924359, at *12 (Nev. Pub. Util. Comm’n Mar. 2, 
2012) (order approving smart meter program) (discussing access and security of data, 
including limits on the use of the data). New Hampshire: Pub. Serv. Co. of New 
Hampshire, 232 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 137, 2004 WL 980139, at *9 (N.H. Pub. Util. 
Comm’n Jan. 9, 2004) (providing data to customers upon request). New Jersey: Provision 
of Basic Generation Serv. for the Period Beginning June 1, 2016, 2015 WL 7423727, at 
*13 (order) (N.J. Bd. Regulatory Comm’rs Nov. 16, 2015). New York: Competitive 
Opportunities Regarding Elec. Serv., 250 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 437, 2006 WL 
2346389 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Aug. 1, 2006) (order). North Carolina: 2016 
Integrated Res. Plans & Related 2016 REPS Compliance Plans, 2017 WL 1209917, at *1 
(N.C. Util. Comm’n Mar. 29, 2017) (order accepting smart grid technology plans) 
(discussing updates to customer and third-party access to usage data). North Dakota: N.D. 
ADMIN. CODE 69-09-02-28 (West 2018) (noting that meter records must be available to 
customers). Ohio: Consumer Privacy Prot. & Customer Data Access Issues Associated 
with Distribution Util. Advanced Metering & Smart Grid Programs, 2012 WL 1743583 
(Ohio Pub. Util. Comm’n May 9, 2012) (finding and order). Oregon: OR. ADMIN. R. 860-
021-0010 (West 2018); Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 2014 WL 4966347, at *6 (Or. Pub. Util. 
Comm’n Oct. 1, 2014) (order regarding Annual Smart Grid Report); Portland Gen. Elec. 
Co., 2005 WL 1313418 (Or. Pub. Util. Comm’n May 18, 2005) (order regarding 
investigation into Meter Information Services and E-Manager Program) (providing that 
customer data must be furnished upon request). Pennsylvania: Smart Meter Procurement 
& Installation, 2012 WL 6839305, at *1 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n Dec. 5, 2012) (final order). 
South Carolina: Carolina Power & Light Co., 2004 WL 1637668 (S.C. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n May 11, 2004) (order approving revisions to meter-related optional programs 
rider). Texas: 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.130 (2018) (requiring easy access to data). 
Vermont: Investigation into Vermont Elec. Utilities’ Use of Smart Metering & Time-
Based Rates, 2009 WL 3159436, at *6 (Vt. Pub. Serv. Bd. Aug. 3, 2009) (order regarding 
memorandum of understanding). Virginia: 20 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-312-90 (LexisNexis 
2018); Additional Implementation Efforts for Competitive Elec. Metering, 2002 WL 
32875884, at *3 (Va. State Corp. Comm’n Aug. 30, 2002) (report of findings & 
recommendations). Washington: WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 480-100-103 (2018) (usage data 
must be provided upon request); Standards Pertaining to Smart Metering & Time of Use 
Rates, 2007 WL 2426799, at *8 (Wash. Util. & Transp. Comm’n Aug. 23, 2007) 
(interpretive and policy statement). West Virginia: Net Metering, Smart Metering & 
Interconnection Standards, 2006 WL 4569355 (W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Dec. 12, 2006) 
(commission order) (noting that customers should have access to data in accordance with 
the Federal Energy Policy Act of 2005). Wisconsin: Sturgeon Bay Utilities, 2015 WL 
9266656, at *1, *3 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Dec. 16, 2015) (final decision granting waiver 
of specific billing requirements). Wyoming: Cheyenne Light, Fuel & Power Co., 2011 WL 
5026187, ¶ 60 (Wyo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Sept. 30, 2011) (findings & conclusions) (noting 
that smart meters “advise” customers of energy usage data). 
 98.  Elec. Supplier Access to Their Customers’ Smart Meter Data, 2014 WL 576106, 
at *3 (D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Feb. 6, 2014) (order); Realizing the Full Potential of 
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI), PUB. SERV. COMM’N D.C., 
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recorded, stored or transmitted by Smart Meter and supporting technology 
and infrastructure is, and shall at all times be and remain, the sole and 
exclusive property of the Company.”);99 and Texas (“All meter data, 
including all data generated . . . by advanced meters . . . shall belong to a 
customer, including data used to calculate charges for service, historical 
load data, and any other proprietary customer information. A customer 
may authorize its data to be provided to one or more retail electric 
providers . . . .”).100 
A Massachusetts decision seems to indicate that there may be a 
difference in ownership rights depending on who collects the data, either 
the utility or the consumer.101 Maine102 and Massachusetts103 actually 
require utilities to provide customer information to a competitor upon 
request. Pennsylvania has a similar statute, requiring “[e]lectric 
distribution companies shall, with customer consent, make available direct 
meter access and electronic access to customer meter data to third parties, 
including electric generation suppliers and providers of conservation and 
load management services.”104 On the other hand, Ohio states that “the 
electric utility shall not disclose customer energy usage data that is more 
granular than the monthly historical consumption data . . . without the 
customer’s written consent or without a court or commission order.”105 
Some states with high smart meter penetration have started thinking 
about this issue. In Illinois, which has more than 2.3 million smart meters 
installed already,106 regulators recently finalized the Open Data Access 
Framework, a plan for sharing data between utilities, customers and third 
parties. According to a fact sheet, “[t]hese rules clarify the type of 
electricity data customers and authorized third parties have access to and 
how the data should be delivered.”107 The goal, in addition for customers 
to understand their own usage, is for utilities “to use price signals as a 
 
http://www.dcpsc.org/Newsroom/HotTopics/Grid-Modernization/Realizing-The-Full-
Potential-of-Advanced-Metering.aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 2018) (providing customer 
access to usage data). 
 99.  Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 2012 WL 3893112 (Okla. Corp. Comm’n July 9, 
2012) (final order approving joint stipulation and settlement agreement). 
 100.  TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.107 (West 2017). 
 101.  Elec. Distrib. Cos. at the Facilities & Homes of Their Distrib. Customers, 2001 
WL 1149629 (Mass. Dep’t Telecomm. & Energy May 18, 2001) (order regarding advanced 
metering proposal). 
 102.  65-407-322 ME. CODE R. § 9 (LexisNexis 2018). 
 103.  220 MASS. CODE REGS. 11.04 (LexisNexis 2018).  
 104.  66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2807 (West 2018). 
 105.  OHIO ADMIN. CODE 4901:1-10-12 (West 2018). 
 106.  David J. Unger, Michigan, Illinois Lead the Midwest in Smart-Meter 
Installations, ENERGY NEWS NETWORK (Feb. 6, 2017), http://bit.ly/2OBQPDe. 
 107.  Energy Data: Unlock Innovation, Cut Pollution, Save Money, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, 
https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/data_access_factsheet_online_version.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 21, 2017). 
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motivator for behavioral change.”108 Among its provisions, the framework 
“include[s] access to billing and usage data for a ‘reasonable fee’ to any 
retail customer or their verifiable agent, and for REPs [retail energy 
providers] and local government agencies, access to ‘generic information 
concerning the usage, load shape curve or other general characteristics of 
customers by rate classification,’ as long as individuals’ data is 
protected.”109 Utilities should also take the goals of the Open Data Access 
Framework into account as the develop new systems, including new 
technology and customer service improvements.110 
Colorado, as part of a $612 million smart grid plan by Xcel Energy, 
required the utility “to provide customers with their energy data through a 
web portal and have that data in a standardized, nationally-used format 
called Green Button Connect My Data (CMD).”111 Specifically, the 
“customer web portal shall include the ability for all customers to access 
their energy usage data and provide that data to third parties following 
required privacy waiver policies,”112 including giving access in machine-
readable form to the customer or customer authorized third-parties, and 
allowing customers to provide their data to anyone at no fee.113  Xcel is 
also supposed to minimize the number of screens or clicks involved in 
obtaining the data, and minimize the time between when a customer 
indicates they want their data shared with a third party and when that 
sharing actually starts.114 The Colorado PUC has also required Xcel to 
 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  St. John, PJM Talks to Congress, supra note 3.  
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Colorado Utilities Commission Approves Xcel Grid Modernization Plan and 
Revenue Decoupling, EUCI (June 27, 2017), https://bit.ly/2S6F0b5. The settlement did 
allow Xcel to implement a different nationally adopted standard if it concluded that the 
alternative would be superior to Green Button Connect My Data. See Unopposed Joint 
Settlement Agreement at 21, Pub. Serv. Co. of Colorado, No. 16A-05888E (Colo. Pub. 
Util. Comm’n May 8, 2017), http://bit.ly/2DAvKIq (“The currently accepted standard to 
achieve this is through a standard known as Green Button CMD, which has been ratified 
by the ANSI-accredited North American Energy Standards Board. The Company will 
implement Green Button CMD unless another standard is nationally adopted and the 
Company believes the new standard is superior to Green Button CMD.”), approved by Pub. 
Serv. Co. of Colorado, 2017 WL 3263777 (Colo. Pub. Util. Comm’n July 25, 2017). Note 
that the Public Service Company of Colorado is a subsidiary of the Xcel public utility 
holding company. See Profile: Xcel Energy Inc (XEL.O), REUTERS, 
https://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/companyProfile/XEL.O (last visited Jan. 15, 
2019). 
 112.  Unopposed Joint Settlement Agreement, supra note 111, at 21.  
 113.  See COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-3 (2018); Unopposed Joint Settlement Agreement, 
supra note 111, at 21–23; see also Customer Self-Service Option, XCEL ENERGY, 
https://www.xcelenergy.com/billing_and_payment/customer_data_&_privacy/customer_
self_service_option (last visited Jan. 15, 2019). The cost to implement Green Button “is 
considered a prudent expenditure,” so will be added to the rate base in the next rate 
proceeding, and recovered from customers as part of their electric bills.  
 114.  Unopposed Joint Settlement Agreement, supra note 111, at 22. 
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ensure compliance by testing the system annually and publishing 
availability metrics.115 
However, even while a right of access is almost universal, this can 
prove difficult in practice. Pepco, the utility serving the District of 
Columbia, claims that the utility provides real time data.116 However, 
despite that claim, obtaining that data can be difficult. Sam Brooks, former 
director of the District of Columbia’s sustainability division, recently 
detailed how it took almost two years with hundreds of meetings and 
conference calls to get workable data for city buildings, data that Pepco 
already had.117  Interestingly, even with regard to data access, some states 
have taken no position, including no regulations to implement the federal 
law requiring access.118 
 
 115.  Id. (“In order to ensure compliance with the technical specifications of the Green 
Button CMD standard, the Company will annually test its Green Button CMD system. In 
the Company’s annual DSM [demand side management] report beginning the first calendar 
year after implementation of Green Button CMD, the Company shall present system 
availability metrics, the results of the annual test(s), information describing the test(s) 
conducted, as well as how any deficiencies will be remedied.”). 
 116.  Pepco, Maryland Elec. Tariff at 40.2 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Oct. 18, 2018), 
http://bit.ly/2zN2HwS. 
 117.  The Energy Gang: The Inconvenient Truth About Cities and Sustainability, 
GREENTECH MEDIA (July 13, 2017), http://bit.ly/2qJJnMK (listen to embedded podcast at 
23–24 minutes). 
 118.  Including Georgia (although Georgia does provide some privacy protections for 
customer data, see Consumer Corner, GA. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, http://bit.ly/2z4uQQA (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2018)); Idaho (which only requires billing information to be available, 
see IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 31.21.01.201 (West 2018)); Indiana (although Indiana does 
specify how such data can be used by the utility, see 170 IND. ADMIN. CODE 4-7-1 (West 
2018); for a discussion of how such data is used by utilities, see Investigation as to Meters 
for Time-Based Pricing & Other Demand Response Programs, 2007 WL 8420640, at *5 
(Ind. Util. Reg. Comm’n Aug. 1, 2007) (order rejecting proposed smart meter standards)); 
Kentucky; Maryland (which at least acknowledges that such data is collected to enable 
customers to conserve energy, see Provision & Regulation of Elec. Serv., 2001 WL 
1890253 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Dec. 11, 2001), but does not have universal data access 
rules; instead, it is left to the individual utilities to determine what they are going to furnish. 
For example, Delmarva provides historical data upon request, see Delmarva Power & Light 
Co., Maryland Elec. Tariff at 12 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Oct. 18, 2018), 
http://bit.ly/2PS8TxD; Easton provides one year of historic data to customers upon request, 
see Easton Utils. Comm’n, Maryland Elec. Tariff at 10 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm’n July 1, 
2017), http://bit.ly/2JXJAVz; Potomac Edison provides data in a “timely manner,” 
Potomac Edison Co., Maryland Elec. Tariff at 4–9 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm’n June 2, 2000), 
https://bit.ly/1FzlNTn; and Pepco claims they provide real-time data, see Pepco, Maryland 
Elec. Tariff, supra note 116 at 40.2); Missouri (which has found that the primary purpose 
of smart meters is to benefit utilities, see A Working Docket to Address Effective 
Cybersecurity Practices for Protecting Essential Elec. Util. Infrastructure, 2012 WL 
3544932, at *1 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n July 17, 2012) (order directing notice and 
directing filing)); Nebraska; New Mexico (stating that smart meters are for “safety and 
reliability, Kit Carson Elec. Coop., 2016 WL 6600679, at *15 (N.M. Pub. Regulation 
Comm’n Oct. 31, 2016) (recommended decision), and that the data should be used “to 
improve customer service and utility operations and lower costs,” 17 N.M. REG. 943, 944 
(Oct. 16, 2006)); Rhode Island (although state law clarifies that utilities own the meters, 
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Access, while important, is different from ownership. The 
determination of who owns the data may actually be, in the long run, more 
important—as that will determine who can monetize the data. 
IV.  CLASSIFICATION AND OWNERSHIP OF ELECTRICITY USAGE 
DATA 
Given the large number of states which have not made a 
determination of how to classify electricity usage data, who owns 
electricity usage data, or who is able to or how to access electricity usage 
data, the potential for market facilitators to develop demand response 
platforms and sharing economy providers to participate to the benefit of 
all society will be informed by traditional concepts of property law.  This 
section will, therefore, discuss how data may be classified in property, how 
that relates to ownership of data, and what other data collection platforms 
may be able to aid in the understanding of how electricity usage data 
should be regulated. 
A. Classification of Electricity Usage Data – Real, Personal, or 
Intellectual Property? 
Traditionally, property is thought of as “a valued resource such as 
land, chattel, or an intangible.”119  Property resources are commonly 
divided into three categories: real, personal, and intellectual property.120  
Real property includes land and “anything growing on, attached to, or 
erected on it, excluding anything that may be severed without injury to the 
land.”121 Personal property is everything that is not real property, is 
movable or intangible, and is subject to ownership.122  Property ownership 
includes the right to possess, use, control, or exclude others from the 
property.123 
 
it does not specify ownership of the data, see Narragansett Elec. Co., 2014 WL 5793320, 
at *30 (R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n Oct. 31, 2014) (report and order)); South Dakota; 
Tennessee; and Utah (which requires access to meters, but says nothing about data, see 
UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 746-310-2 (West 2018)). 
 119.  Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 120.  Todd Janzen, What Makes Ag Data ‘Ownership’ Unique, PRECISION FARMING 
DEALER (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.precisionfarmingdealer.com/articles/1967-what-
makes-ag-data-ownership-unique. 
 121.  Real Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 122.  Personal Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
 123.  Janzen, supra note 120. 
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The first two property categories existed under common law,124 but 
intellectual property (“IP”) was statutorily created.125  IP is defined as “a 
category of intangible rights protecting commercially valuable products of 
the human intellect.”126  IP “comprises primarily trademark, copyright, and 
patent rights, but also includes trade-secret rights, publicity rights, moral 
rights, and rights against unfair competition.”127  The relationship between 
intangible property, such as IP, and tangible objects can be extremely 
close, but intangible property is distinct from tangible goods.128 
Even within the category of IP, there are two specific forms. The first 
is “hard,” industrial IP, “such as a patent, that excludes others from using 
the invention without the holder’s consent even if others find the 
innovation independently.”129  The second is “soft,” artistic IP, “such as a 
copyright, that does not preclude independent creation by third parties.”130  
When a copyright is owned, an individual must acquire permission to use 
the copyrighted material or data.131 Under the fair use doctrine, an 
individual may use a part of a copyrighted work without permission.132 
Fair use of copyrighted digital information can occur when it is used in a 
manner “fundamentally different than the use intended by” the original 
creator.133 
Data is a unique form of property because it is intangible and can be 
“transferred at almost zero marginal costs.”134 Unlike tangible goods, 
where a property owner has “exclusive rights and control over the good,” 
 
 124.  Historically, the distinction between real and personal property comes from the 
“types of assets administered on death” by the king’s courts. 1 RICHARD R. POWELL, 
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 5.04, at 5-7 to -8 (Patrick J. Rohan ed., rev. ed. 1998). 
 125.  See Janzen, supra note 120 (noting in the U.S. that Congress outlines protections). 
 126.  Intellectual Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  LIONEL BENTLY & BRAD SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 1, 2 (4th ed. 
2001) (“For example, when a person posts a letter to someone, the personal property in the 
ink and parchment is transferred to the recipient . . . . [T]he sender (as author) retains 
intellectual property rights in the letter.”). 
 129.  Robert Rankin, Intellectual Property in 2017, ACADEMIA, 
http://www.academia.edu/34890540/Intellectual_Property_in_2017.pptx (last visited Jan. 
15, 2019).  
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Heather Bussing, Who Owns Data 3: Intellectual Property, HR EXAMINER (Apr. 
10, 2013), http://www.hrexaminer.com/who-owns-data-3-intellectual-property/ 
[hereinafter Bussing, Intellectual Property]. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that Google indexing images by creating excerpts from a porn website was fair 
use). 
 134.  Helena Uršič, The Troublesome Concept of Data Ownership, MULTUM IN PARVO 
BLOG (Mar. 3, 2016), http://multuminparvo89.blogspot.com/2016/03/the-troublesome-
concept-of-data.html?m=1. 
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this rarely occurs with data.135 Generally, digital information falls under 
soft IP rights and is available for fair use.136 
While a few scholars have detailed their conception of data as 
property, there is little agreement about how data should be treated. Helena 
Uršič states that personal data has “been described as the new oil” and is 
becoming more commonly viewed in terms of property rights instead of 
privacy rights.137 She claims that property rights in personal data refer to 
an “entitlement to exclude [others] from personal data by default.”138 
Specifically, “there is no disclosure, collection or use of personal data by 
default.”139 Classifying data as property allows for strengthening personal 
rights, such as data privacy protections.140 If consumers owned their 
personal information by default, then they “would be able to bargain with 
data users to determine when it would be advantageous to forfeit their 
privacy by selling their data.”141 Privacy rights over the data are fragile.142  
Additionally, Uršič declares that the most valuable asset in the information 
business may not be the data itself, but the technology and methods used 
to analyze and decipher the data.143 These technologies are more 
commonly available to companies and businesses, and the owners of such 
technology may make the most productive use of the data. 
Heather Bussing states that “indexing or data retrieval may not be 
something you can own.”144 Further, “when organized data is functional 
[instruction] instead of just [uniquely created] content, it’s closer to 
common knowledge or a standard design that should not be owned by one 
company.”145 
Jacqueline Lipton states that, in the United States, “databases are 
[generally] not protected by copyright law,”146 but the data management 
methods may be protected under hard IP law. Lipton is concerned that 
“large amounts of relatively mundane information could be locked away 
 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Fair use of digital information can occur when it is used in a manner 
“fundamentally different than the use intended by” the original creator. Perfect 10, 508 
F.3d at 1168.  
 137.  Uršič, supra note 134.  
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Heather Bussing, Who Owns Data 5: Privacy, HR EXAMINER (Apr. 24, 2013), 
https://www.hrexaminer.com/who-owns-data-5-privacy/.  
 143.  Uršič, supra note 134. 
 144.  Bussing, Intellectual Property, supra note 131. 
 145.  Id.  
 146.  Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property: Rights and Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L. 
REV. 135, 143 (2004). The exception is when there is some originality to the management 
or arrangement of the information in the database. Id. 
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from society and may only be accessible through payment of prohibitive 
fees.”147 She believes that property rights for data should be granted but 
with “commensurate legal duties.”148 This avoids giving too much 
monopolizing power over information while providing adequate personal 
protections and benefits.149 Specifically, she argues that the “legal and 
financial burdens of balancing information property rights against other 
competing interests in relevant information” should “be predominantly 
borne by the right holders themselves as legal duties attached to the 
privilege of property ownership.”150 Lipton further argues that “the state 
has a responsibility to monitor and control the performance of such duties, 
particularly where the state itself has supported the creation and 
commercial exploitation of the relevant property rights.”151 She prefers 
“balancing private rights against legal duties inherent in information 
ownership, drawing on theories of traditional Property ownership as a 
preferable framework for balancing competing interests in 
information.”152 Lipton generally discusses applying concepts and lessons 
from the fair use doctrine, real property, and IP law for identifying proper 
ownership and corresponding obligations to other interested parties.153 
Jessica Litman focuses on different approaches to protecting data 
privacy. She disagrees with a property-based approach that “[p]eople 
should own information about themselves and, as owners of property, 
should be entitled to control what is done with it.”154 She concludes that 
“a property rights approach would be unlikely to improve [data privacy] 
matters; indeed, it would tend to encourage the market in personal data 
rather than constraining it.”155 Litman concludes that a tort based model of 
data privacy protections would be a modest improvement over a property 
based approach.156 She notes that “[i]n Europe, it is illegal to release 
personal data to a third party, or even to use it for a purpose unrelated to 
the reason for which it was collected, without the subject’s consent.”157 
Further, most protections come from industry self-regulation.158 Litman 
 
 147.  Id. at 147. 
 148.  Id. at 148–49. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. at 150. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id. at 151. 
 153.  Id. at 150–88. 
 154.  Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
1283, 1287 (2000). 
 155.  Id. at 1288. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. at 1286. 
 158.  Id. at 1286–87. 
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laments that there are no federal privacy laws.159 She believes that what 
“data privacy really needs is federal statutory protection” and “tort 
litigation is actually a plausible route to enactment.”160 Litman claims that 
a tort law strategy is “comparatively benign” versus property rights for 
data protection.161 
Julie E. Cohen disagrees with “data processors and other data privacy 
opponents [who] argue that imposing restrictions on the collection, use, 
and exchange of personal data would ignore established understandings of 
property, limit individual freedom of choice, violate principles of rational 
information use, and infringe data processors’ freedom of speech.”162 
Cohen discusses two theories of ownership. The first is the labor-desert 
theory that “focuses on the right of self-determination and the acquisition 
of property through the investment of labor.”163 Under this theory, a person 
owns the data generated by their actions and can exclude others from it. 
She criticizes this theory because there is no way “I would have the right 
to control what another gathers through his or her own diligence, even if 
what is gathered is information about me.”164 The second theory is the 
utilitarian theory, which “takes as its primary purpose maximizing human 
satisfaction or benefit” and that this idea dominates property law.165 She 
concludes that: “categorical arguments . . . mask fundamentally political 
choices about the allocation of power over information, cost, and 
opportunity. Each debate, although couched in a rhetoric of individual 
liberty, effectively reduces individuals to objects of choices and trades 
made by others.”166 Rather, the discussion “should be grounded in an 
appreciation of the conditions necessary for individuals to develop and 
exercise autonomy in fact, and that meaningful autonomy requires a 
degree of freedom from monitoring, scrutiny, and categorization by 
others.”167 To address data privacy protection, strong legal and 
technological tools should be designed.168 
Gianclaudio Malgieri “aims to prove how trade secrets, rather than 
database sui generis rights, are the most interesting and flexible property 
right for coping with the challenge of customer data appropriation in the 
 
 159.  Id. at 1291–92. (Since 2000, there have been some privacy protection laws passed, 
but those are focused on specific narrow industries and not the general economy.) 
 160.  Id. at 1313. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 
52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1373 (2000). 
 163.  Id. at 1381. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. at 1373. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Id. 
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new, collaborative economy 3.0.”169 He proposes reconceptualizing 
personal data into “a contextual, relational, trade-centered protection of 
personal data in the form of trade secrets.”170 Malgieri emphasizes: 
[A]s personal data are generally secret, economically valuable, and 
protected by security measures, we can affirm that consumers (though 
they are not companies) “hold” a trade secret right on their personal 
data. Moreover, trade secrets are used in “trade” relationships and in 
this case, consumers have a commercial interest to protect—re-
balancing their trade asymmetry and their commercial vulnerability.171  
He believes that “the traditional idea of property as absolute dominion is 
inappropriate for the information economy,” and “a fluid and relational 
property right such as quasi-property” is an “interesting solution,” 
“because (data) privacy depends widely on the ‘context’ where some 
information is produced.”172 Malgieri claims that trade secrets are the best 
solution to the issue of property alienability because “trade secret law has 
a number of default rules that might be useful for information privacy 
protection (e.g., data cannot be used for other purposes without obtaining 
permission for the new uses; license rights are nontransferable unless the 
licensor grants a right to sublicense, etc.).”173 Lastly, he claims that a trade 
secret solution gives the best chance of “global harmonization” for 
personal data protection.174 
Jane Baron argues that talking about information control in property 
terms is misleading.175 Contrary to Malgieri, she believes that “[b]ecause 
the degree to which property grants control is itself fundamentally 
contested within property law and theory, ‘property’ cannot tell us how 
much control individuals should have over their medical or personal 
information.”176 Baron concludes that “the concept of property alone 
cannot tell us how much, or what kind, of power” is granted to people to 
control their information.177 
Two commentators focus on narrower issues related to data. Daniel 
Martin believes there should be a universal “right to destroy” digital 
 
 169.  Gianclaudio Malgieri, “Ownership” of Customer (Big) Data in the European 
Union: Quasi-Property as Comparative Solution?, J. INTERNET L., Nov. 2016, at 1, 3. 
 170.  Id. at 12. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Id. at 12–13. 
 173.  Id. at 13. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Jane B. Baron, Property as Control: The Case of Information, 18 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 367, 417 (2012). 
 176.  Id. at 418. 
 177.  Id. 
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information and data.178 Brenda M. Simon, when discussing data-
generating patents, believes that the patents are highly valuable and 
criticizes people who believe the generated data should automatically 
belong to the patent owner.179 Simon is concerned that providing default 
ownership rights for patent-generated data “may overcompensate 
inventors for their efforts.”180 
Finally, a treatise by Raymond T. Nimmer proposes defining data 
rights and privacy rights through a property law framework.181 He “defines 
property rights in information [and data] by giving (or denying) the 
individual a right to control the use of the information even when that 
information is in the hands of another party.”182 Further, both privacy and 
trade secrecy law “create a right to restrict [the] disclosure or use by third 
parties of confidential information.”183 Nimmer’s analysis focuses the 
inquiry on five policy and legal questions: (1) “What attributes describe 
private information that qualifies as property?,”184 (2) “What actions did 
the purported owner take regarding disclosure of the information?,”185 (3) 
“What is the scope of the right?,”186 (4) “How does the location or source 
 
 178.  Daniel Martin, Note, Dispersing the Cloud: Reaffirming the Right to Destroy in 
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REV. 377, 378 (2017) (discussing Myriad’s genetic testing and Google’s algorithms). 
 180.  Id. at 414. 
 181.  RAYMOND T. NIMMER, LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 17:18 (West 2018). 
 182.  Id.; see also Raymond T. Nimmer & Patricia Ann Krauthaus, Information as a 
Commodity: New Imperatives of Commercial Law, 55 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 105 
(1992). 
 183.  NIMMER, supra note 181, § 17:18. 
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for which disclosure might cause risk of loss in terms of harassment, embarrassment, or 
similar consequences.”). 
 185.  Id. (“In trade secret law, this refers to the security efforts taken and the extent to 
which that owner limited (or permitted) general disclosure. A similar component exists in 
‘privacy’ law, although not in ‘data protection’ law. Intimate details of a life disclosed in 
an autobiography are not private. The property interest is waived. On the other hand, 
personal information not revealed in an indiscriminate manner qualifies. To an extent, 
privacy law protects information in direct relationship to the owner’s efforts to protect the 
information.”). 
 186.  Id. (“In both privacy and trade secret law, a recognized right exists to make 
conditioned or conditional disclosures that restrict the right of the information recipient. In 
commercial practice, the restrictions typically arise from the contract. In privacy law, the 
more normal source comes in law (statute or regulation) directly restricting the recipient’s 
use or disclosure.”). 
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of the information affect the right?,”187 and (5) “Against which interests 
does the property right fail?”188 
While there continues to be disagreement about how data is classified 
in terms of property law, it still may be possible to draw parallels between 
electricity usage data and other types of data to determine how regulators 
– and society at large – should legislate its ownership and govern its 
sharing. 
B. How the Real/Personal/IP Classification Relates to 
Ownership of Data 
There is a distinction between “owning something” and “just having 
a right to use it.”189 Absolute ownership is acquired in three ways. First, a 
person can give something as a gift that, once given, is entirely 
irrevocable.190 Second, an exchange for value through a sale or trade.191 
Third, something created by a person is owned by that person.192 Often, 
there is a question of who originally created the information,  and 
ownership and use rights can be split amongst various interested parties.193 
When multiple parties create something together, they “usually make an 
agreement or exchange for value about who owns the end result.”194 
Contractual rights to use something are not property ownership.195 
The two most relevant contractual rights, for the purposes of this article,196 
are shared ownership and licenses. Shared ownership is when “more than 
one person owns something together.”197 Normally, there is a way to 
 
 187.  Id. (“Privacy creates a nonexclusive property right. There exists a right of 
independent discovery. Information obtained from unprotected or published sources can 
be freely used independent of the underlying property interest. In contrast, obtaining the 
information from otherwise protected contexts may infringe the privacy right. A distinction 
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 192.  Id. 
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quickly convert one’s ownership into cash, such as through selling a share 
of stock, land, or partnership interest.198 The other contractual right is a 
license, which gives the “right to use someone else’s stuff” while the 
owner maintains their ownership.199 Licenses are flexible and are the most 
frequently applied contractual concept for digital information.200 
Especially under soft IP law, ownership is uncertain and is most often 
protected and designated via contract.201 
Lastly, there are some things that do not belong to anyone.202 
Specifically, the categories that fall under non-ownership are people, 
contraband, natural forces, common knowledge and facts, works in the 
public domain, and ideas that have not been patented or copyrighted.203 
The non-ownership concepts of common knowledge, public domain, and 
ideas are also relevant to discussing data ownership.204 If data falls into 
one these non-ownership categories, then there cannot be an ownership or 
property claim.205 Often anyone can collect the same or similar data using 
basic observational abilities or by creating their own new process.206 
Under fair use, uniquely owned or copyrighted data can be repurposed or 
entirely transformed into something new, thus ending the original 
ownership rights.207 Therefore, digital information frequently falls under a 
non-ownership doctrine, such as fair use, soft IP (copyrights) or 
contractual (licensing) rights. 
However, ownership is a prerequisite to sharing and participating in 
the sharing economy “[o]nly if an individual owns something can she 
share it.”208 Therefore, the question of ownership is central. 
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C. Traditional Property Law Concepts Applied to Electricity 
Usage Data 
While none of the above commentators discussed electricity usage 
specifically, a few secondary sources discuss smart meter data access,209 
and others have focused on the privacy concerns inherent with electricity 
usage data.210 However, none has resolved what structure of ownership or 
rights should be to enable the sharing economy with regard to electricity 
usage data. This section looks at traditional property law concepts and how 
they could be applied to electricity usage data to maximize the potential 
adoption of demand response and the maximum generation of negawatts. 
1. Discovery Doctrine 
Long the basis for the colonization of real property, the discovery 
doctrine supports a theory that property rights should go to the party that 
will use the disputed good in the most economically productive manner.211 
Economically speaking, market facilitators could make the most 
economically productive use of electricity usage data, as, with this data, 
they could determine which sharing economy providers would be both 
most willing and could benefit the most from participating in the market 
for negawatts. Being able to target sharing economy providers is only 
possible with the electricity usage data—and a modern-day application of 
the discovery doctrine to electricity usage data would suggest that states 
should determine how to provide that data to market facilitators. 
 
 209.  See Cheryl Dancey Balough, Privacy Implications of Smart Meters, 86 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 161, 173 (2011); Natasha H. Duarte, The Home Out of Context: The Post-Riley 
Fourth Amendment and Law Enforcement Collection of Smart Meter Data, 93 N.C. L. REV. 
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 210.  See Megan McLean, Note, How Smart Is Too Smart?: How Privacy Concerns 
Threaten Modern Energy Infrastructure, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 879, 885 (2016); 
Sonia K. McNeil, Note, Privacy and the Modern Grid, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 199, 207 
(2011). See generally Dana B. Rosenfeld & Sharon Kim Schiavetti, Third-Party Smart 
Meter Data Analytics: The FTC’s Next Enforcement Target?, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 
2012 (discussing FTC regulation of third-party access). 
 211.  See Steven T. Newcomb, The Evidence of Christian Nationalism in Federal 
Indian Law: The Doctrine of Discovery, Johnson v. Mcintosh, and Plenary Power, 20 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 303, 322 (1993). 
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2. Adverse Possession 
Adverse possession, today used only by those with the specialized 
knowledge to take advantage of it,212 was historically one way for those 
who made productive use of the land to obtain title to it.213 Similar to the 
discovery doctrine, adverse possession allows the transfer of ownership 
based on use—with an active non-owner trumping a non-active owner. 
For electricity usage data, this doctrine, if applied to data, would 
again support the data going to a non-owner who would actively use the 
data, especially when that use would benefit society as a whole. In 
traditional adverse possession, the activity most often only benefited the 
person who took the land.214 With electricity usage data, one individual 
making productive use of his or her data is rare—but market facilitators 
could certainly make more productive use of many individuals’ data. 
Utilities, on the other hand, have not made use of this data—even as they 
have access to it, and the ability to use it currently. Their non-use provides 
another reason to ensure it does not remain potentially owned—and 
unused—by them. 
3. Highest and Best Use 
Used in eminent domain proceedings and to determine tax value, the 
highest and best use of a property is commonly defined as the “reasonable, 
probable and legal use of vacant land or an improved property, which is 
physically possible, appropriately supported, financially feasible, and that 
results in the highest value.”215 Most important to this analysis, the 
determination of the highest and best use value does not take the current 
uses into account, but instead looks at what might be (rather than what 
is).216 
For electricity usage data in the energy sharing economy, the highest 
and best use could support market facilitators having a right of access to 
the data, as the highest and best use of the data—the use that would create 
the highest value—would be to have that data available. 
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4. Fair Use 
Fair use provides an affirmative defense to the unlicensed use of 
copyright-protected works in certain circumstances, including “criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research.”217 The 
purpose, however, is mainly for freedom of expression, and traditionally 
has not been readily available to those activities with a commercial nature. 
However, those uses that are “transformative”—those uses that “add 
something new, with a further purpose or different character, and do not 
substitute for the original use of the work”—are more likely to be 
acceptable under fair use.218 
For electricity usage data, it certainly could be argued that allowing 
a market facilitator to have access to the data is transformative, and that 
the individual data is being used with a further purpose—to obtain societal 
goods, not necessarily possible with only the original, dispersed data. By 
having a market facilitator able to aggregate the data, it is transforming the 
data from what one person has access to into the ability to animate the 
market and, by extension, the sharing economy. 
D. What can electricity usage data be compared to? 
Privacy is often a concern cited with smart meter data.219 Framing 
information property through privacy law “defines property rights in 
information [and data] by giving (or denying) the individual a right to 
control use of information even when that information is in the hands of 
another party.”220 Both privacy and trade secrecy “create a right to restrict 
disclosure or use by third parties of confidential information.”221 
Regarding data-protection, the legal system works to make “rules of 
behavior and operational limits” to protect individuals’ personal 
information from becoming disclosed.222 This concern around privacy is 
also present in other data-rich environments, including: agricultural data, 
medical records, and the information collected during use of the internet. 
 
 217.  More Information on Fair Use, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
https://www.copyright.gov/fair-use/more-info.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2018). 
 218.  Id.  
 219.  Interestingly, for water smart meters, Hawaii allows full public disclosure of 
water consumption data, as the public interest in water use outweighs individual privacy. 
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 92F-12 (West 2018). A federal appellate court has also ruled that 
a utility’s collection of smart meter data—even under a mandatory program—is not an 
unreasonable search, and that the city’s interests in smart meters outweigh any privacy 
concerns. Amanda Reilly, Court Rules Smart Meter Data Search is ‘Reasonable,’ 
GREENWIRE (Aug. 17, 2018), http://bit.ly/2Ka6qcD. 
 220.  NIMMER, supra note 181, § 17:18. 
 221.  Id.  
 222.  Id.  
 2019 SHARING NEGAWATTS 391 
1. Agricultural Data 
Todd Janzen, when discussing the concept of agricultural (“ag”) data 
“ownership,” believes that United States law does not recognize ag data 
ownership and that ag data is a mix of real, personal and intellectual 
property.223 Intellectual property law protects trade secrets, such as the 
formula for Coca-Cola, but there are no laws that specifically recognize ag 
data as a form of IP, although it may qualify for trade secret protection. 
What does this mean for “ownership” of ag data? As a form of 
property, ag data is a mix of real, personal and intellectual property. Yield 
data, for example, is information inextricably linked to the land, like real 
property. Yield data is also highly portable, like personal property. But 
yield data also contains valuable information, like intellectual property or 
trade secrets. Those characteristics make ag data unique from other forms 
of property. Farmers can own real, personal and intellectual property, but 
ag data is hybrid of all three. 
Actors up and down the agricultural supply chain want to “turn data 
into value”—specifically by enabling farmers to know which actions to 
take to improve efficiency.224 This also provides information back to the 
company selling the technology—enabling agriscience and seed 
companies to sell more personalized service, equipment manufacturers to 
sell higher-value services, and providing commodity traders more accurate 
forecasts of yields and quality.225 
Can we say the farmer owns his or her data? Yes, if the farmer owns 
the field, the farmer owns the equipment that creates the data and the 
farmer generates the data. But when others are involved in creating that ag 
data form of property, ownership becomes a more difficult question, such 
as when the farmer leases the equipment from a third party or uses a third-
party sensors and database to collect and analyze the data. 
As with energy, the other issue is one of monetization. With “[h]uge 
volumes of data about how crops grow . . . now easily available,” the issue 
becomes analysis of that data.226  If the farmer does not clearly own the 
data, but rather a third-party aids in its collection or analysis, it is “widely 
assumed that the data generated by farmers is free.”227 
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2. Medical Records 
Medical records are another area where privacy has been deemed 
important, and, therefore, legislation has been enacted to protect it.228 Of 
course, this is for multiple reasons, but one of the main reasons is the 
potential for prejudice—from insurance companies, should they know 
family medical history, and, therefore what you are more likely to need 
care for, and from employers, who pay at least a part of those expenses. 
In single-payer systems, these privacy concerns are not as defensible, 
as the government is paying for your care, regardless of what your family 
history is, and your employer doesn’t have anything directly to do with the 
costs—those are spread out among all taxpayers and employers, rather 
than an employer being more fiscally responsible for a certain group of 
employees. Given that situation, the healthcare system uses data to 
improve clinical care and foster clinical research and has been doing so for 
decades.229 
Some states had attempted to collect data from all insurance programs 
to aid in the effective implementation of the Affordable Care Act,230 but 
insurers sued to keep that data from states, and the Supreme Court ruled 
that was correct for certain self-insured employer insurance plans.231 
Almost twenty states have databases for insurance information,232 and the 
federal government provides data on Medicare and Medicaid to the states 
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with healthcare databases.233 Interestingly, despite a request from the 
insurance companies involved in the case, the Supreme Court did not hold 
who owned the data.234 In addition to ownership, the insurance companies 
were also looking for a clear holding on the right to access the data.235 
3. Active and Passive Internet Use 
Similar to medical records, where patients are often asked for consent 
to share data without perhaps understanding what they are agreeing to, 
internet use often brings up similar privacy, property, and data issues. A 
study conducted by the International Institute of Communications 
identified two types of data collection: active and passive.236 Actively 
collected data is information “voluntarily revealed to the [collector] by the 
user.”237 Because it requires their participation, users are typically aware 
this information is being collected. Sometimes, however, “much of the 
data collected occurs without the user being involved or aware that a data 
transmission has taken place.”238 This passively collected data is 
“information that is automatically revealed to the service provider and 
does not require active participation by the user.”239 
There is also a “subset of passively collected data called inferred data. 
Inferred data is information that is [generated or created] from existing 
data through analytic models.”240 Since both passive or inferred data 
occurs without active participation, “users generally are not aware” this 
data is being collected.241 
Consent currently covers most active and passive internet use, which 
users often give by hitting a pop-up button in an app. “Google would like 
to use your location”—hit “allow” or “block.” This could be seen as a form 
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of license—you are giving permission to access your data until you make 
an affirmative choice otherwise. However, who owns that data—you or 
the firm collecting your movements around the web—is unclear at this 
point in time. And whether it would be different for active versus passive 
data is also still yet to be determined. 
V. WHAT CHANGES ARE NECESSARY TO ENABLE THE ENERGY 
SHARING ECONOMY? 
The question then becomes—with these theories of property, 
traditional doctrines, and other examples, how should legislators and 
regulators think about the ownership of and access to electricity usage 
data? And how could those choices impact the energy sharing economy? 
A. What classification and ownership structure would best 
enable the energy sharing economy? 
As Janzen argues with ag data, electricity usage data also has aspects 
of real, personal, and intellectual property.242 Electricity usage data is 
intimately tied to a physical location, implying real property. However, the 
electricity usage is due to individual actions of the inhabitants of the real 
property, some of which occurs away from the real property (like running 
down electronics when out and then charging them at home). Electricity 
usage data, like ag data, can also be portable—and, absent large variations 
in housing stock characteristics, is likely to be similar wherever a certain 
individual or group of individuals is living, because it is, to some degree, 
based on behavior. Electricity usage data, therefore, has some 
characteristics of personal property. As noted in the examples of the 
competitive electricity markets, however, it also contains valuable 
information, and therefore is characteristic of intellectual property. Like 
ag data, electricity usage data seems to be a hybrid, not able to be classified 
easily into a single area. 
Even given the inability to easily classify electricity usage data, it 
would seem to make the most sense to use the structure associated with 
intellectual property, but adopting the reasoning behind more traditional 
property doctrines, like highest and best use, to inform valuation, 
ownership and a right of access. While that adopts parts of current 
scholarly thought on data ownership, it does not fit neatly into any 
articulation to date. 
If personal data is “the new oil,”243 a property right to exclude others 
by default would lead to society—and the individual sharing economy 
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provider—not being able to benefit from the energy sharing economy. 
While a framework that allows consumers “to bargain with data users”244 
might sound, at an abstract level, to be the best, it has issues in practice, at 
least with electricity usage data. It may be easy to bargain for certain 
things, but currently, the data is held by utilities—who do not want to give 
it up, and with whom the sharing economy provider has little bargaining 
power. Disagreeing with the terms of your electrical service in many areas 
is impossible—unless you want to completely go off-grid. Additionally, 
the electricity usage data only becomes advantageous when utilized by a 
market facilitator—so, without the initial data access, it would be 
impossible for the sharing economy provider to understand when it would 
be advantageous. The right of access is needed before the understanding 
can occur. Uršič notes this herself, recognizing that the asset may not be 
the data itself, but the technology and methods used to analyze and 
decipher the data; the owner of that technology is the one able to make the 
most productive use of the data.245 
After the access and understanding, then the sharing economy 
provider and the market facilitator can come to mutually agreeable 
licensing terms, which provide benefit to each. For example, the market 
facilitator could determine the likely number of negawatts a particular 
sharing economy provider could create at certain times, and the sharing 
economy provider can tell the market facilitator the price that would need 
to be paid to take the actions necessary to create the negawatts. This would 
also take Malgieri’s perspective into account, as the sharing economy 
provider could have a commercial as well as societal benefit in sharing 
their actions.246 
Lipton’s concern that data useful to society may be locked away and 
only accessible through the payment of prohibitive fees247 is something 
that is already occurring. Even where a right to access exists, some utilities 
or states require a fee payment, even when the data is only being requested 
by the individual sharing economy provider, not third parties. Other 
locations require payment for aggregated data to be accessed by third 
parties, even though this data is not granular enough for market facilitators 
to ensure they are contacting the correct sharing economy providers.248 
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Lipton’s argument that balancing is appropriate when determining access 
and ownership249 would again point to fair use or highest and best use as 
the method that should be used. 
In focusing on Nimmer’s analysis, an interesting point is made 
immediately—under most concepts of data as property or trade secrets, the 
information is protected because the commercial value derives from the 
data not being known or disclosed.250 With electrical usage data, that is not 
the case, unless looked at from the utility’s perspective. For a utility, if a 
market facilitator cannot help a sharing economy provider determine 
value, then that is a commercial benefit, as the sharing economy provider 
will continue to consume more electricity at times of the day when more 
load requires more infrastructure, leading to an increase in capital spend 
for the utility and, therefore, a higher profit. In the majority of cases, 
utilities are not utilizing the data—instead, they continue to only use it for 
the traditional uses of basic customer service and billing.251 For these 
reasons, from the perspective of the sharing economy provider, the market 
facilitator, and society at large, the benefits accrue to the data being 
shared—not kept secret. 
Cohen’s arguments focus on the value choices that need to be made 
around data access and ownership252—and, indeed, those choices are being 
made now, but without significant input from others outside the utility 
industry. By adopting a framework that allows market facilitators access, 
at a minimum, to electricity usage data, we, as a society, are 
acknowledging that this data can have significant societal benefits. As 
those benefits, in some cases, go against the interest of the utilities who 
now collect and keep the data,253 it will be necessary to make a value 
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choice about how much we want those benefits to accrue to society and 
the greater electrical grid, and develop a framework that allows market 
facilitators to enable those societal benefits to occur. 
B. How could legislators and regulators adopt that framework? 
If we, as a society, are to embrace the highest and best use of 
electricity usage data to enable behavioral change and societal good 
maintaining reasonable privacy rights, states, at a minimum, need to enact 
regulations to enable market facilitator access to this data.254 However, to 
achieve this goal, the access cannot be to electricity usage data in the 
aggregate—that does not provide market facilitators with what they need 
to animate the market. To animate the market, market facilitators need 
access to individual, identifiable records. 
One way to manage this with the concern around privacy is to allow 
for an opt-out. This would address the various subsets of privacy 
concerns—that others might profit from one’s personal data, that it is 
personal, that it could lead to price discrimination or invasive marketing, 
or just that someone is uninterested in helping the country move to a more 
efficient grid. And opt-out—rather than an opt-in—would allow those 
sharing economy providers who do not want to participate in the market 
to remove themselves and maintain their electricity usage data as 
private.255 (It would still be available in non-identifiable, aggregate form 
for research and grid planning purposes, as it is today to utilities.) Given 
shifting privacy concerns around sharing all sorts of data, the amount of 
the population wishing to opt-out will likely decrease over time.256 Having 
an opt-out, rather than an opt-in, has been used with electricity usage data 
before—everyone with a smart meter in BGE’s territory is opted-in to their 
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behavioral demand response program, but individuals can choose to opt-
out of the program. Legislators and regulators could, therefore, adopt an 
opt-out program of a right to access data for energy sharing providers and 
market facilitators. To ensure that everyone who wanted to opt-out could, 
regulators and legislators could also require opt-out through multiple 
channels—by phone call, with a bill insert, on a website and through an 
app.257 An opt-out right of access also conforms to Malgieri’s view that 
“absolute dominion is inappropriate for the information economy.”258 
Utilities—understanding that third parties may better understand 
what customers want and how to provide it for them—may be loath to 
provide data unless statutorily or regulatorily required to do so. Therefore, 
voluntary programs will be insufficient. Like medical records, states could 
develop databases to promote efficiency in the market, and ensure that 
demand response was being offered to those who had not opted-out and 
who could save the most money by being sharing economy providers, 
assuming they wanted to do so. 
The opt-out is needed for another reason. Even if they are not averse 
to a program, few take the time to opt-in—as noted by the relatively low 
percentage of accounts that currently participate in utility demand 
response programs at around five percent.259 
Rather than waiting and having policies develop piecemeal, PUCs 
should take action to promote consistency in data-sharing policies 
regarding usage and systems data. This will enable third party aggregators 
and others to flourish, providing products and services that benefit 
consumers, the grid, and the environment. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Customers should be able to take advantage of their data, and 
legislators and regulators should be focused on ensuring that technologies 
that could be disruptive (in a good way) to the traditional utility model by 
allowing customers to use less electricity when they want to and control 
their energy use260 are implemented efficiently and effectively. The utility 
industry has “more unused data at its disposal than any other industry.”261 
And the amount available will only increase—ten large utilities are 
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expected to undertake new meter deployments between now and 2020, in 
addition to the half of the country that already has smart meters.262 This 
data can be the basis for the energy sharing economy, with sharing 
economy providers, market participants, and society as a whole benefiting 
from a framework that provides for the highest and best use of the data 
utilizing an opt-out method of privacy protection. Given how infrequently 
most customers think—and how few customers care—about their energy 
data, the overall societal good, both economic and environmental, from 
harnessing this data counsels for an opt-out program. Adequately 
balancing property and privacy, this framework would allow the energy 
sharing economy to thrive for as long as markets adequately value the 
shared action. 
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